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In December 1994, Mexico's devaluation of the peso triggered a severe crisis in the
country's financial system. The crisis created serious liquidity and solvency problems for
the entire banking system, exposing its weak capital base and widespread portfolio prob-
lems. International financial markets reacted with panic, and investor confidence all but
disappeared. The large inflows of capital that followed Mexico's economic liberalization
and accession to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) abruptly shifted
outwards, prompting a massive rescue effort from the United States, the IMF, and Mexican
authorities. The extent to which the Mexican peso crisis affected capital flow in Mexico
and throughout the region is commonly referred to as the "tequila effect."I
Although the peso devaluation proved to be the catalyst that triggered the crisis, it was
widespread instability in the banking sector that created the environment necessary for a
crisis to occur. Arguably, this instability transformed what should have been an economic
adjustment into a full-blown, severe financial crisis.
This essay is divided into three main parts. Part One provides a legal and economic
overview of the Mexican Peso Crisis. The first section outlines the legal and economic core
issues that have affected the financial law systems of emerging market economies-paying
additional attention as to how Mexico fits within the broader experience. The second sec-
tion focuses on the historical development of Mexico's banking system and the govern-
ment's financial liberalization under President Salinas's administration. The third section
discusses several factors that analysts now view as the underlying causes of the banking cri-
sis, paying particular attention to the macroeconomic policy decisions and political events
in Mexico during 1994 leading up to the peso devaluation. Finally, the fourth section
describes the immediate economic effects of the crisis on the banking system and interna-
tional rescue efforts.
Part Two provides a detailed analysis of the Mexican Government's law reform initia-
tives in response to the crisis and the extent to which these initiatives have fostered bank-
ing soundness in Mexico. The first section discusses some of the most significant short-
term government initiatives, such as fiscal austerity measures, liquidity assistance, the tem-
porary capitalization program, and debtor-relief programs. The second section describes
several significant long-term structural reforms, such as the relaxation of foreign invest-
ment limitations under NAFTA, the facilitation of bank mergers and sales, and the estab-
lishment of peso futures markets. The third section explains some of the vast and far-
reaching supervisory and regulatory reforms implemented, such as stricter lending stan-
dards, increased reporting and disclosure requirements, and proposed measures to amend
the structure of the Mexican financial regulatory system.
Part Three consists of an assessment of Mexico's legal and economic reforms. The first
section provides an analysis of some of the key successes of the new reforms and gives
examples of recent positive developments. The second section discusses some of the defi-
ciencies that remain in Mexico's financial system. Finally, the third section concludes the
essay with a few comments regarding Mexico's financial system.
1. The term "tequila effect" was apparently coined in the banking policy literature because of the
need for recovery in the region after Mexico's overspending and overborrowing. The effect of the
crisis is thus likened to the alcoholic "hangover" that can result from overindulging in tequila, a
Mexican liquor.
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PART ONE
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
I. Banking Crises in Emerging Market Economies.
A. RECENT TRENDS.
The incidence of banking crises in the 1980s and 1990s has been significantly higher
than in past decades. Indeed, from 1980 to 1996, seventy-three percent of the International
Monetary Fund's (hereafter IMF) member countries experienced at least one bout of sig-
nificant banking-sector problems. 2 This trend is especially evident in emerging market
economies. Banking crises in emerging market economies merit particular attention
because they have serious repercussions for the domestic economy and also for other
countries as international financial markets have become more integrated.
Despite the expansion of capital markets in emerging market economies, banks contin-
ue to hold the lion's share of financial assets and are by far the dominant financial intermedi-
aries. The banks operate the payments systems, are major purchasers of government bonds,
and provide liquidity to fledgling securities markets.3 Consequently, the banking sector is
likely to remain the principal source of systemic vulnerability in the financial sector.
The cost to taxpayers of supporting, recapitalizing, and restructuring troubled banks
can be enormous if authorities fail to bring the problems under control quickly.4 "Senior
Mexican officials estimate that the tab for 'rehabilitating' the balance sheets of Mexican
banks could run as high as 8.5 percent of GDP."5 Others estimate that the cumulative fiscal
and quasi-fiscal outlays associated with bank restructuring could amount to as much as
fifteen percent of Mexico's GDP.6
B. SOURCES OF INSTABILITY.
Although macroeconomic instability and external shocks have been significant factors
in past financial crises, the root causes are generally to be found in microeconomic and
institutional failings. Generally, problems begin with poor management within financial
institutions, and more broadly, with weak internal governance by owners and managers. 7
Poor internal controls, connected lending, insider dealing, and fraud are often the source
2. See Morris Goldstein and Philip Turner, Banking Crises in Emerging Economies: Origins and Policy
Options, (BIS Economic Paper No. 46) Oct. 1996, at 5.
3. See David Fairlamb, Beyond Capital Adequacy: Banking Problems of Emerging Markets and
Internal Capital Standards, 1997 Inst. Inv. 125, available in 1997 WL 9673747.
4. See Ruth de Krivoy, Crisis Avoidance, in BANKING CRISES IN LATIN AMERICA 171 (Ricardo
Hausmann & Liliana Rojas-Suarez, eds., 1996).
5. Fairlamb, supra note 3, at 4.
6. See Group of Ten, Working Party, Financial Stability in Emerging Market Economies, 9 (Apr. 1997)
[hereinafter Group of Ten].
7. See Michel Camdessus, The Challenges of a Sound Banking System, in BANKING CRISES IN LATIN
AMERICA 535 (Ricardo Hausmann & Liliana Rojas-Suarez, eds., 1996); see also Group of Ten,
supra note 6, at 15.
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of poor asset quality. Moral hazard 8 worsens when owners do not face proper incentives to
act prudently and to supervise managers, who may then be guided by objectives that are
not compatible with sound financial practices and be shielded from external discipline.9
Weaknesses in the legal framework compound the problems of lax management and weak
corporate governance, for instance by undermining the collection of collateral. Once credit
quality has been compromised, regulatory shortcomings and supervisory forbearance can
aggravate matters by failing to identify problems and preventing them from being
addressed in a comprehensive and timely fashion.10
Banking crises have frequently occurred following periods of rapid expansion in eco-
nomic activity linked to the emergence of unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances, often
combined with market distortions. A sudden correction in asset prices following the emer-
gence of these imbalances exposes the underlying weaknesses of the financial sector and
acts as the trigger for a crisis. 1
Financial liberalization can also contribute to financial instability during the transi-
tion period by increasing the exposure to credit and foreign exchange risks, particularly
when undertaken in an unstable macroeconomic environment.1 2 Financial institutions in
recently liberalized financial systems often lack the experience to manage these risks and,
in the face of'stronger competition, institutions will tend to be pushed towards riskier
investments.1 3 Others take too many risks in the expectation that the authorities will step
in if they run into trouble.
Weaknesses in accounting, monitoring, and reporting procedures are another culprit.
Lack of adequate loan classification procedures undermines the internal governance in
banks, as well as market discipline and official oversight. 14 In some cases, weak classifica-
tion and provisioning requirements for problem loans can even allow management to
show adequate capital the day before a bank collapses.
Appropriate capital standards provide incentives to bank owners to temper high-risk
gambles since their own money is at stake. Banking systems that do not force bank owners,
managers, and creditors to suffer at least a portion of the losses created by the bank's insol-
8. "Moral hazard" might be defined as actions taken by economic agents to maximize their own
utility to the detriment of others in situations where agents do not bear the full consequences of
their actions. See William P. Osterberg, The Hidden Costs of Mexican Banking Reform, FED.
RESERVE BANK OF CLEV., Jan. 1, 1997, at note 10.
9. Heavy government involvement in the banking sector or loose controls on connected lending
also have been at the root of many emerging-market-country-banking crises, as the political
objectives of governments or the personal interests of bank insiders come to supersede the com-
mercial, profit-maximizing objectives of banks. See Morris Goldstein, The Case for an
International Banking Standard, INSTITUTION FOR INT'L ECON., Apr. 1997, at 14; see also Group of
Ten, supra note 6, at 16.
10. See Group of Ten, supra note 6, at 9.
11. Id.at 10.
12. For a comprehensive economic analysis regarding the effectiveness of financial liberalization in
Latin American countries, see Glenn Westley, Financial Liberalization: Does it Work? The Case of
Latin America, (Inter-American Development Bank Working Paper No.) July 1994, at 194.
13. A 1995 report by economists Kaminsky and Reinhart concerning the causes of banking crises
revealed that the financial sector had been liberalized some time during the previous five years in
18 of the 25 banking crises in their sample. See Goldstein, supra note 9, at 14.
14. See Camdessus, supra note 7, at 537; see also Goldstein, supra note 9, at 16.
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vency, and that do not give bank supervisors enough institutional protection against
strong pressures for regulatory forbearance, share the blame for bank crises. 15
Mexico's banking system in the years prior to the crisis was plagued by all the inade-
quacies described above. In the recently liberalized banking system, bank managers and
supervisors were poorly equipped to handle the increased exposure to credit and foreign
exchange risks. Moreover, favorable capital flows during the early 1990s resulted in exces-
sive lending to less-than-creditworthy borrowers. The lack of adequate accounting stan-
dards also contributed to the instability of the banking system by masking the true nature
of banks' balance sheets and thereby reducing banking system transparency. These and
other factors, discussed below, created a highly unstable and vulnerable banking system.
II. Historical Overview of Mexico's Banking System.
The recent history of Mexico's banking system is one of turbulence. Mexico has expe-
rienced several financial crises since the mid-1970s, and on a number of occasions has
been forced to seek financial assistance from the United States and the IMF to help it man-
age such crises.
A. THE 1982 CRISIS AND NATIONALIZATION.
The last major financial crisis prior to 1994 began in 1982 when Mexico announced
that its reserves had run out and that, without financial assistance, Mexico would be forced
to default on $80 billion in mainly dollar-denominated foreign debt obligations to U.S.
and other foreign banks. 16 The United States and IMF arranged a $4.55 billion rescue
package, which entailed a substantial rescheduling of Mexico's debt obligations. 17
Soon after the crisis began, President Lopez Portillo nationalized all but two of
Mexico's sixty private commercial banks, imposed exchange controls, and initiated a series
of consolidations, which continued until only eighteen commercial banks remained.1 8 In
addition, the Mexican Congress amended its constitution to provide that all banking and
financial services activities were to be the exclusive domain of the government. 19
During this period of state ownership of the commercial banks, Mexico was severely
underbanked." 20 The government's control of the banking system resulted in crowding
out credit to the private sector as banks' investment portfolios shifted toward government
securities, and loans were made to state-controlled enterprises rather than to private sec-
tor entities.
21
15. Goldstein, supra note 9, at 18.
16. See Nora Lustig, Mexico in Crisis, The U.S. to the Rescue: The Financial Assistance Packages of 1982
and 1995,2 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 25,31 (1997).
17. The debt obligations were repeatedly rescheduled throughout the 1980s until eventually the
remaining debt was converted into bonds under the Brady Initiative. See Rory Macmillan, The
Next Sovereign Debt Crisis, 31 STAN. J. INT'L L. 305 (1995).
18. See Sri-Ram Ayer, Anatomy of Mexico's Banking System Following the Peso Crisis, WORLD BANK
SECTOR REP. (1996); see also Carlos M. Nalda, NAFTA, Foreign Investment and the Mexican
Banking System, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 379,386 (1992).
19. See Nalda, supra note 18, at 386.
20. See Roy A. Karaoglan & Mike Lubrano, Mexico's Banks After the December 1994 Devaluation - A
Chronology of the Government's Response, 16 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 24,25 (1995).
21. Eventually, nearly 100% of bank credit was directly or indirectly allocated by the government.
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State ownership had several other adverse effects on Mexico's banking system. An
immediate problem was that the commercial banks lost many experienced officers who
strongly disapproved of the nationalization and subsequently resigned their posts rather
than accept the government as their employer.22 Those bank officers who remained, or
who were acquired to fill the vacancies created by the departing officers, did not receive
proper training in the credit business since only a small fraction of loanable funds were
channeled to the private sector.
Additionally, since the principal borrower was the government, a sovereign entity, the
risk evaluation function was practically ignored during this period.23 Excluded from the
capital markets, the Mexican banking system stagnated, and credit growth reached its low-
est rate in years. Further, Mexico's insulation from foreign bank competition created an
environment of lax complacency. Internal controls received little attention, and bankers
failed to develop disclosure and informational systems in pace with their counterparts
from other world banking systems. In such an environment, there was little incentive for
either the public servants administering the commercial banks or the supervisory authori-
ties to worry much about loan portfolio risk.24
B. PRIVATIZATION AND LIBERALIZATION UNDER THE SALINAS ADMINISTRATION.
Since 1988, the Mexican financial system has undergone deep structural changes.
During the first days of 1989, President Carlos Salinas de Gotari initiated comprehensive
reforms in an effort to promote sustained economic growth while controlling excessive
inflation, which stood at an annual rate of 160 percent.25
A central aspect of the government's plan was the privatization of the state-owned
Mexican banks and the encouragement of limited foreign investment in the banking sys-
tem. The government hoped that foreign investment in the banks would encourage the
transfer of technology and the modernization of the banking system and thus allow the
banking system to reverse the decline in productivity experienced during the 1980s.
Bank privatization and financial liberalization began in earnest in 1990. Among the
legal reforms made were the liberalization of deposit and lending rates, elimination of the
mandatory requirement for commercial banks to hold long-term government paper to
maturity, and the elimination of reserve requirements. 2 6 By the end of 1992, all of Mexico's
eighteen state-owned banks had been re-privatized. 2 7 Twelve of the eighteen banks were
22. See Miguel Mancera, Problems of Bank Soundness: Mexico's Recent Experience, in Banking
Soundness and Monetary Policy (Int'l Monetary Fund, ed., Jan. 1997).
23. See id. at 229.
24. See id. In addition to the problems listed above, bank officers were rarely held accountable for
mismanagement.
25. See John H. Chun, Post-Modern Sovereign Debt Crisis: Did Mexico Need an International
Bankruptcy Forum? 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2647, 2654 (1996).
26. See Ayer, supra note 18.
27. The privatization of the banking system was far more successful than originally anticipated. The
first eight banks, representing 56% of Mexico's nationalized bank assets, sold for a total of $7.68
billion at an average of 3.12 times their book value. Several reasons explain the high prices paid
for the banks, including industrial growth, profit potential, and the desire to secure a place in the
growing Mexican market. By the time that privatization process was completed in 1992, Mexico
had garnered a total of $12.4 billion. See id.; see also Nalda, supra note 18, n. 106.
98 NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the Americas
purchased by holding companies, which were dominated by brokerage houses, and which
generally have a higher risk tolerance than banks.28 Moreover, many of the new bank pur-
chasers were far from seasoned bankers and they generally paid higher than average prices
in order to acquire the banks.
In addition to the privatization of the state-owned banks, Mexico instituted numerous
changes in the legal framework governing the financial sector. These structural changes
were designed to encourage increased competition in financial services from foreign insti-
tutions, but at a gradual rate so that domestically controlled financial institutions could
have time to adjust by adopting new technologies, internal infrastructure, and services.
In 1990, Congress enacted the Law for the Regulation of Financial Groups. 29 This
statute allowed conglomerate banking, whereby a single holding company could carry out
separate commercial banking, brokerage, and other financial services activities. 30
Unfortunately, the legislation lacked important prudential requirements. 31
The Mexican Congress simultaneously enacted the Law of Credit Institutions, 32 which
allowed majority private sector ownership of commercial banks. The statute created a legal
framework for the capital structure and operations of the banking system, under which
investors could acquire one or more of three different types of stock in Mexican banks,
dependent upon the investor's status. 33 The statute also dictated the maximum levels of
foreign investment allowed for Mexico's domestically controlled financial institutions.34
C. NAFTA PROVISIONS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES.
Mexico's financial reforms culminated in 1994 with the enactment of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 35 between Mexico, the United States, and
Canada. Under the agreement, Mexico agreed to allow U.S. and Canadian financial institu-
tions to provide financial services through the establishment of subsidiaries or affiliates in
Mexico. 36 Mexico further agreed to provide both "national treatment" 37 and "most-
28. Stephen L. Fluckiger, The Mexican Banking Crisis: Remedies and Opportunities, 50 CONSUMER FIN.
L. Q. REP. 76 (1996).
29. "Ley para Regular las Agrupaciones Financieras" D.O., 18 de julio de 1990 (Mex.).
30. See Miguel Angel C. Garza, The Mexican Financial System: Toward a German Universal Banking
Model?A Comparative Analysis, NAFrA L. REv., Autumn 1997, at 46.
31. Such prudential requirements might include: producing consolidated financial statements, fol-
lowing credit exposure rules, and other practices designed to limit a holding company's exposure
to the insolvency of one of its entities.
32. "Ley de Instituciones de Credito;' D.O., 22 de julio de 1994( Mex.).
33. See Nalda, supra note 18.
34. See Ayer, supra note 18. The law limited foreign ownership of a single bank's capital stock to 5%,
but allowed up to 10% ownership with government approval and under certain conditions.
These limitations were later amended to comply with the provisions under Chapter 14 of the
NAFTA Treaty. Id.
35. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993)
[hereinafter NAFTAJ.
36. See Garza, supra note 30, at 53-54. To facilitate the control of monetary policy by the Banco de
Mexico, the Mexican Government chose not to allow foreign banks to establish branches.
37. See PAUL ET AL., NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 68 SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS (1993)
(national treatment requires each NAFTA party to treat another party's financial institutions and
investors no less favorably than domestic financial institutions and investors).
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favored-nation treatment" 38 to cross-border financial service providers and investors from
other NAFTA countries.
Financial services are governed principally by Chapter 14 of NAFTA. 39 Chapter 14
requires each party to permit individuals and companies from the other NAFTA countries to
establish financial institutions in its territory and to expand the operations of such institutions
throughout its territory.40 To be eligible for the benefits under Chapter 14, the foreign institu-
tion or investor must already be engaged in the business of providing financial services.4 1
The agreement, however, also provided Mexico with several significant reservations.
Section B of Annex VII (Schedule of Mexico) imposes capital limits during the six-year
transition period following the effective date of the agreement.42 There are two types of
capital limits: individual limits for each foreign-owned institution and aggregate limits for
all foreign-owned institutions of the same type.43 The capital limits apply only during the
transition period, with some exceptions. 44 The original capital limit for individual institu-
tions began at 1.5 percent.45 The aggregate industry capital limit began originally at eight
percent.4 6 Both of these limits were to increase yearly throughout the transition period
until the year 2000, at which point all limits would expire. 47
D. MEXICO'S FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM.
The Mexican financial law system is a purely national system. Accordingly, all of the
authorities which are involved in the supervision and regulation of banking activities
belong to the federal government. "Authority for regulating the activities of banks in
Mexico is shared among the Banco de Mexico, 48 the Ministry of Finance and Public
Credit, and the National Banking and Securities Commission (CNBV). ' 49 The Ministry of
Finance is considered the head of the financial sector and is the only authority with legal
powers to interpret financial laws.50 Other principal functions of the Ministry of Finance
38. See id. Most-favored-nation treatment requires each NAFTA party to treat another party's finan-
cial services providers and investors no less favorably than financial services providers and
investors from any other country. Id.
39. For an excellent analysis of the financial services provisions under NAFTA, see NAFTA AND
BEYOND: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DOING BUSINESS IN THE AMERICAS (Joseph J. Norton & Thomas
L. Bloodworth, eds., 1995).
40. NAFTA, supra note 35, art. 1403.
41. Id. art. 1403(5).
42. Id. annex VII(B)(l)-(7)-Mex.
43. Id. annex VII(B)(2), (5)-(6)-Mex.
44. Id. annex VII(B)(1), (9), (C)(Definitions)-Mex.
45. Id. annex VII(B)(2)-Mex.
46. Id. annex VII(B)(5)-Mex.
47. The agreement included a further safeguard provision which permits Mexico, under certain con-
ditions, to freeze for three years the aggregate capital limits.
48. "In June 1993, the Mexican Constitution was amended and legislation went into effect granting
the Banco de Mexico greater autonomy and more clearly defining its functions as those relating
to conduct of monetary policy and supervision of the payments system and foreign exchanges
markets." See Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra note 20, at 43 n.6.
49. The CNBV was created in May 1995 through a merger of the National Banking Commission
(CNB) and the National Securities Commission (CNV). Id. at 43 n.8.
50. Id. at 28.
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include: determining the composition of capital in all banking corporations and providing
the legal basis to calculate the specific amounts of money available for loans and to diversi-
fy the risks in all active operations of credit institutions.5 1
The CNBV's mandate is to perform the supervisory, remedial, and regulatory func-
tions concerning the operation of all financial entities.52 Under its supervisory authority,
the CNBV conducts liquidity and solvency examinations to evaluate the possible risks to
which banks may be subject. The CNBV also conducts periodic bank inspections and
establishes operative programs to reduce existing irregularities that may affect the liquidity
and solvency in banking corporations.53
The CNBV may impose monetary penalties against banking corporations and, in cases
of serious or repeated violations, may issue a decree for the suspension of the financial enti-
ty's charter.54 Additionally, the CNBV may recommend that bank managers and directors
be removed from office and may operate as administrative receiver of the institution.
Since April 1994, the Banco de Mexico has been an autonomous entity responsible for
the country's monetary and price stability policies.55 The Banco de Mexico also serves as
the depository, lending institution, and clearinghouse regulator for credit institutions. 56
The Banco de Mexico is further authorized to impose sanctions against financial interme-
diaries, including civil monetary penalties and suspension of operations in foreign curren-
cies, gold, and silver.57
Beyond the primary supervisory authorities, the Law of Credit Institutions provides
for the establishment of the Banking Fund for Savings Support (Fondo Bancario para
Proteccion de Ahorro, or FOBAPROA) and defines the legal basis for its provision of "pre-
ventative support" to troubled banks.58
FOBAPROA's role goes beyond simple deposit insurance. FOBAPROA has broad pow-
ers to extend preventative support to banks to permit them to meet their obligations,
securing such support through a pledge of shares of the commercial bank recipient or its
financial holding company.5 9 Under amendments approved in February 1995,
FOBAPROA is further empowered to exercise the voting rights of shares that have been
pledged to it, take majority control of the bank or financial group, replace management,





55. "Ley del Banco de Mexico" D.O., 23 de diciembre de 1993, arts. 1-2 (Mex.).
56. "Ley de Instituciones de Credito' D.O., 22 de julio de 1994, art. 122 (Mex.).
57. "Ley del Banco de Mexico," arts. 24,29,32 (Mex.).
58. "FOBAPROA is organized as a trust administered by the Banco de Mexico. However, Article 122
of the Law of Credit Institutions establishes that FOBAPROA's policies will be established by a
technical committee with its members appointed by the Ministry of Finance, the CNBV, and the
Banco de Mexico. A majority of the members of the technical committee are appointed by the
Ministry of Finance.' See Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra note 20, at 43 n. 10.
59. "Under the Law of Credit Institutions, the fund is required to give notice each December of the
types of bank assets it will cover the following calendar year. Each year since its inception,
FOBAPROA has stated its intention to assure the payment of all liabilities of Mexican banks,
other than subordinated debt' Id. at 28.
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write down the bank's capital in accordance with the results of a full audit, and sell the
bank if amounts extended as preventative support are not repaid or if serious undercapi-
talization or irregularities are uncovered in a bank.60
I1. The Roots of the Crisis.
A. BANKING FRAGILITY AND UNSUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC EXPANSION.
The NAFTA agreement, and the financial liberalization which preceded it, sparked sig-
nificant foreign investment in the banking sector. With a rapidly expanding population of
almost ninety million people, most of whom were under-banked and under-leveraged,
Mexico's consumer market presented an attractive opportunity for the highly developed
retail banking industries of the Untied States and Canada.61 The period immediately fol-
lowing the agreement's effective date on January 1, 1994 saw exceptionally high growth. 62
Not surprisingly, once privatized, Mexican banks competed fiercely to gain market
share in the provision of loans, both by increasing the volumes of their existing lines of
business and by venturing into relatively new financial services, such as home mortgages
and credit cards.63 The consolidation of public finances shifted banks' lending behavior
away from financing the government and toward riskier lending to the private sector. As
banks were privatized, their risk evaluation staffs, either brand-new or inherited from the
period when the government owned the banks, were ill-prepared to operate in this new
environment.64 As a result of both macroeconomic stabilization and financial liberaliza-
tion, a financial deepening occurred in which the availability of domestic loanable funds
increased significantly for Mexican banks.
In addition to the greater availability of domestic funds for lending, Mexico received
large inflows of capital from 1990 to early 1994 in response to the almost complete elimi-
nation of capital controls in 1989 and the global trend of capital flows to emerging mar-
60. "ITihe flexibility accorded FOBAPROA under the Law of Credit Institutions has permitted it to
function as the instrument for a number of the Mexican Government's responses to the effects of
the peso crisis on the banking sector.' Id. at 30.
61. Id.
62. Several foreign institutions filed applications with the Ministry of Finance seeking authority to
invest in or establish Mexican financial services firms. By October 17, 1994, the Finance Ministry
had approved 54 applications from foreign financial services firms to operate in Mexico. The 54
firms consisted of 19 banks, 16 stock brokerage firms, 12 insurance companies, 2 financial leasing
firms, and 5 financial groups. See Fluckiger, supra note 28, at 77.
63. "As a consequence, between 1991 and 1994, aggregate assets of the commercial banks increased
by 111.3% in nominal terms, or by 64.6% in real terms, equivalent to a real annual growth rate of
18.1%. In 1994, assets of the commercial banking system averaged N$735 billion, equivalent to
58.8% of GDP, compared to 42.5% for 1991. The bank's loan portfolios grew at an even higher
rate than their assets. From year-end 1991 to year-end 1994, aggregate gross loans (excluding dis-
counted loans) increased by 142.9% in nominal terms, or by 89.2% in real terms, equivalent to
an annual real growth rate of 23.7% (more than eight times the rate of GDP growth during the
period).' Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra note 20, at 25-26.
64. See Banco de Mexico, The Mexican Economy 1996, IV(2)(a) (1996)
<http://www.banixco.org.mx/public html/doyai/mexecon96/mexecon.html> [hereinafter The
Mexican Economy 1996].
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kets.65 According to the IMF, Mexico attracted approximately $93 billion in net capital
inflows from 1990 to 1994, more than half of the flows into all of Latin America.66
Naturally, the newly available funds found many eager takers in the private sector.
Between 1988 and 1994, the ratio of bank credit to the private sector increased from 13.4
percent of GDP at year-end 1988 to 50.7 percent in 1994.67 Private sector demand for
bank credit was strong for several reasons, including: (1) favorable expectations of
Mexican economic performance; (2) the need to modernize and expand Mexico's industri-
al plant in light of increased competition resulting from a more open economy; (3) the
appalling housing shortage; (4) higher perceived permanent income; (5) consumers wish-
ing to replace obsolete stocks of durable goods; and (6) the need to finance the acquisition
of public enterprises being privatized. 6
8
To a certain extent, the greater availability of credit and the increased private sector
consumption of that credit were viewed favorably; they were the intended results of
Mexico's financial liberalization policies. However, improved expectations about the future
course of the economy caused inexperienced bank credit officials and bank managers to
confuse good and bad credit risks. 69 In such an environment, too many borrowers seemed
to have profitable projects and reasonably good prospects for servicing their debts.
Moreover, borrowers who had forgotten how to use credit prudently, or who had never
had any prior experience in paying debts, often failed to practice caution.
Several developments accompanied the expansion of credit to the private sector. First,
the structure of credits shifted conspicuously toward financing consumer and mortgage
credit. Mortgage and consumer credit is riskier than a business loan because legal proceed-
ings to recover the collateral in the case of default are particularly cumbersome, often ren-
dering the collateral of little use. Additionally, credits denominated in dollars-which are
subject to exchange rate risk-grew rapidly until 1992, when the central bank imposed
restrictions on the increase of foreign currency liabilities of commercial banks.70 Overall,
the imprudent expansion of lending to the private sector led to a significant drop-off in
portfolio quality.71
The "crawling peg" exchange rate system, 72 although effective in controlling Mexico's
high inflation, contributed to the current account deficit by overvaluing the peso and
65. See Mancera, supra note 22, at 229.
66. However, foreign capital inflows during this period were more heavily weighted to relatively liq-
uid portfolio investment rather than to foreign direct investment. Portfolio investment from
1990 to 1994 constituted 60% of foreign capital inflows, compared to about 18% for foreign
direct investment. See A. James Meigs, Mexican Monetary Lessons, The Cato Journal, Vol. 17 No.
1, (visited Dec. 9, 1997) <http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj17n I-4.html>.
67. See Mancera, supra note 22, at 229.
68. Id. at 230.
69. See The Mexican Economy 1996, supra note 64, IV(2)(a).
70. See Mancera, supra note 22, at 230.
71. Aggregate past due loans of commercial banks grew from 4.09% of gross loans at the end of 1991
to 7.25% of gross loans at the end of 1993. See Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra note 20, at 26.
72. Under a "crawling peg" exchange rate system, the domestic currency is pegged to a foreign cur-
rency, such as the U.S. dollar, at a fixed rate, but the rate is allowed to fluctuate within a narrow
band. This band can be adjusted periodically to accommodate upward or downward trends in
the exchange rate. It is through these periodic adjustments that the peg "crawls" See Chun, supra
note 25, at 2700 n.60.
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thereby artificially increasing the price of Mexican exports and reducing the price of
imports.73 Mexican imports exploded from 1987 to 1994, while exports grew more slowly
during this period.74 Real GDP growth in Mexico was modest, averaging only 2.7 percent a
year in the early 1990s. 75
These trends in Mexico were perceived as manageable since the system had sufficient
flexibility in interest rates and the exchange rate band to manage macroeconomic imbal-
ances. To subsidize its current account deficit, Mexico relied on portfolio investors to pur-
chase short-term, peso-denominated treasury notes, called "cetes." Cognizant of the volatil-
ity created by the short-term nature of the cetes, the government nevertheless hoped that
Mexico's continued attractiveness to foreign investors would prevent capital flight. The
government fully anticipated that exports would expand as Mexico's competitiveness and
productivity improved, and that this would lead to a reduction in the current account
deficit and a decrease in the dependence on foreign capital.
Moreover, the Salinas Administration needed to present an image of stability to inter-
national investors and to the U.S. Congress during the NAFTA negotiations. The U.S.
Congress had not yet embraced the prospect of entering into a trade agreement with
Mexico and there was already mounting opposition to the agreement from the Senate and
House Democrats. Any attempt to correct the current account deficit and shrinking for-
eign exchange reserves with a substantial peso devaluation before completing the NAFTA
negotiations (or prior to the vote in Congress) would likely have resulted in an economic
recession and could have easily derailed the negotiations and jeopardized the progress
achieved during the previous five years. Those were risks that the government was unwill-
ing to take.
The Mexican banking system was still in its infancy just a few years after privatization.
Accordingly, banks were relatively fragile and were beginning to show signs of weakness
toward the end of 1993. The supply of capital was becoming increasingly insufficient due
to the relatively high level of past-due loans that had not been adequately provisioned.
Moreover, some commercial banks were operating with serious problems, which were not
readily noticeable from the information disclosed to financial authorities.76 In such a frag-
ile state, the banking system was ill-prepared for the macroeconomic and political events
that unfolded in 1994.
B. THE EVENTS OF 1994.
Sadly, Mexico suffered a series of unfortunate political and economic shocks in 1994
that forced investors to reconsider their investments and also endangered the sustainability of
73. See id. at 2656.
74. "[Tihe Mexican trade balance deteriorated from an export surplus of $8.4 billion in 1987, to a
deficit of $-.7 billion in 1989, and reached $-20 billion in 1992 and a $-18.5 billion deficit in
1994. At the same time, Mexico's current account balance declined from a $4.0 billion surplus in
1987 to a $-4.0 billion deficit in 1989, getting much worse with a $22.8 billion deficit in 1992, and
a $-28.8 billion deficit in 1994. As a share of Mexican GDP, the current account deficit was 1 per-
cent of GDP in 1987, -.9% of GDP in 1989, -4.1% in 1992, and -5.2% in 1994.' William A.
Lovett, Lessons From the Recent Peso Crisis in Mexico, 4 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 143, 152 (1996).
75. See Ayer, supra note 18, at 5.
76. See Mancera, supra note 22, at 231.
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Mexico's spending policies. The first event was an armed uprising of Indian rebels that broke
out on January 1, 1994 in the Chiapas region. The uprising was timed to coincide with the
effective date of the NAFTA treaty and was a significant blow to Mexico's image as a stable
and mostly conflict free modernizing country seeking to join the developed world.77 Then
on March 23, 1994, Mexico's image was again tarnished by the assassination of presidential
candidate Louis Donaldo Colosio. On the day after the assassination, the Mexican Stock
Exchange fell by twenty-two points. Additionally, Mexico experienced large losses in foreign
exchange reserves due to investors' increasing fears of political turmoil in Mexico.78
Mexico responded by raising interest rates only slightly, allowing the peso to rise to
the ceiling of its exchange rate band, and offering higher interest rates on cetes to attract
foreign investment and offset further losses in foreign reserves. 79 During this period,
Mexican authorities also began to shift the composition of the country's short-term inter-
nal public debt from cetes to dollar-indexed securities, called "tesabonos," thereby transfer-
ring the exchange rate risk from investors to the government.8 0
By the middle of 1994, Mexico was entering into another expansionary stage and there
was an evident need for measures to reduce the current account deficit. But with Zedillo
trailing in the polls only three months before the presidential election, the government
ruled out a substantial devaluation in the peso as too disruptive. 81 Indeed, the government
exacerbated the problem by pumping credit into the economy through government devel-
opment bank lending. Finally, the government ruled out any significant increases in interest
rates because it was fearful that higher interest rates could severely impact a banking system
that had already been weakened by the growing volume of past-due loans.
The government's failure to respond adequately to the current account deficit was
based in part on the assumption that once the August presidential elections had concluded
successfully, the stabilization of the political situation would calm the markets, causing
capital inflows to resume and allowing the government a greater opportunity to engineer a
smoother adjustment. Contrary to the government's assumption, however, conditions did
not improve after the election. Instead, political stability was put into question once again
in September 1994 when the ruling party's secretary general, Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu,
was assassinated in Mexico City. In November, foreign investors began reducing their
exposure in Mexico causing reserves to decline by approximately $5 billion. 82 By
December, foreign reserves had reached dangerously low levels. The Chiapas rebellion
intensified and immediate pressure hit the Mexican Bolsa and the peso.
77. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO REPORT: MEXICO'S FINANCIAL CRISIS:
ORIGINS, ASSISTANCE AND INITIAL EFFORTS TO RECOVER, GAO/GGD-96-56 (Feb. 23, 1996) [here-
inafter MExIco's FINANCIAL CRISIS].
78. By April 22, barely a month after the assassination, foreign reserves had declined by $10.8 billion.
Id. at 52.
79. Although this action did not violate the commitment to exchange rate stability, it allowed for a
significant depreciation in the value of the peso. By April 22, the peso was nearly 8% lower
against the dollar than it was in mid-February. Id. at 58.
80. By the last week of April, there was nearly a sevenfold increase in tesabonos offered and a 57%
reduction in cetes. The issuance of tesabonos created approximately $30 billion in short-term,
dollar-linked liabilities. See Mexico: Country Overview, in TRENDS IN DEVELOPING ECONOMICS
1996, (World Bank 1996); see also Chun, supra note 25, at 2657.
81. The peso had already depreciated 10% since March. See Lovett, supra note 74, at 154.
82. See Ayer, supra note 18, at 5.
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To alleviate the pressure on the peso, Mexico announced a fifteen percent devaluation
of the peso on December 20, 1994.83 In the absence of any parallel policy to manage possi-
ble large withdrawals, investors continued to reduce their exposure, causing international
reserves to fall to $10.5 billion.84 The following day, after further capital flight of $4 billion,
the Mexican Finance Minister reluctantly announced that its foreign reserves were insuffi-
cient to cover the adjusted exchange rate, and the peso was allowed to freely float.
Events after the devaluation did not lead international investors to conclude that
Mexico was stable, either. To the contrary, investors' skepticism regarding Mexico's finan-
cial future grew in light of the Mexican Government's apparent unwillingness to raise
interest rates to market levels. Perception became reality as investors, concerned that
Mexico would not be able to finance its short-term tesabonos debt, refused to roll over
their maturing tesabonos. 85 Because its reserves had fallen to such a low level, the govern-
ment was no longer able to meet the redemption demands of all the bondholders. These
events pushed an already weak banking system toward insolvency.
C. THE EFFECTS OF THE PESO DEVALUATION ON THE BANKING SYSTEM.
The direct impact of the December 1994 devaluation on Mexico's commercial banks
was softened somewhat since the Banco de Mexico had previously imposed a ceiling on
the amount of foreign currency denominated liabilities that banks could incur.86 This
measure was based in part on the consideration that the Banco de Mexico had a limited
ability to act as lender of last resort with respect to foreign currency liabilities, and it assist-
ed in preventing the run on banks' external obligations in early 1995 from being worse
than it was. 87
Unfortunately, the indirect impact of the devaluation on the banking sector was sub-
stantial. Inflation and interest rates skyrocketed, economic activity fell sharply, and banks
began to suffer a liquidity shortfall. Without sufficient liquidity, banks were unable to roll
over certificates of deposit that were coming due, resulting in even higher interest rates.
The higher interest rates resulted in a decline in the value of the banks' assets, as those
assets were mainly investments in fixed income securities.
In the first quarter of 1995, interest rates on home mortgages, consumer credit, and
commercial credit rose to over eighty percent per annum. 88 Furthermore, the December
devaluation of the peso and the further depreciations in subsequent months, along with
83. Mexico's Finance Minister, Guillermo Ortiz, later admitted that the sudden, sharp devaluation in
the peso "was less than impeccably executed." See Guillermo Ortiz, Comment, Banking Soundness
and Monetary Policy, INT'L MONETARY FUND (1997) at 217.
84. See Chun, supra note 25, at 2658.
85. Sixteen billion dollars worth of tesabonos were due to mature in early 1995 and payment obliga-
tions on tesabonos for the entire year exceeded reserves by $23 billion. Id. at 2659.
86. This ceiling limited commercial banks' foreign currency obligations to 20% of total liabilities and
prohibited the banks' net short or long foreign currency from exceeding 15% of net capital. See
Ayer, supra note 18, at 7.
87. Nevertheless, commercial banks sustained foreign currency losses totaling more than 10% of
equity (NP$ 4.6 billion) in the system. Some banks tried to recoup their losses immediately fol-
lowing the peso devaluation by converting net short positions into net long positions. Id.
88. However, in the second quarter after the devaluation, interest rate growth subsided and nominal
rates declined to approximately 35%. Id.
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the higher interest and inflation rates,89 the over-indebtedness of households and compa-
nies, and economic recession, made it much more difficult for debtors to make their debt
service payments.90 This brought about further increases in banks' past-due portfolios and
significant declines in their capitalization ratios.
IV. The U.S./IMF Rescue Package.
A few days after the devaluation, the governments of Mexico and the United States
realized that the source of the instability was the Mexican debt profile. Mexico took
action by seeking a financial assistance package from the United States to help stave off
the liquidity crisis. 9 1 "Although Mexico had sufficient incoming oil revenue to honor the
random repayment demands of its bondholders, it did not have sufficient resources at
hand to redeem all of the maturing bonds from the panicking multitude of bondhold-
ers."92 This prompted the arrangement of an $18 billion rescue package, announced on
January 2, 1995.
Authorities presumed at the time that such a large assistance package would calm the
market since it covered the outstanding tesabonos held by foreign investors coming due in
1995.93 However, the rescue package was too small to cover the bank certificates of deposit
and other short-term obligations coming due in 1995. Through simple arithmetic calcula-
tions, investors estimated that, assuming no investors were willing to roll-over their invest-
ments, the $50 billion in public and private short-term debt obligations coming due in
1995 was far greater than the resources available.94
By the end of the first week of January, it became dear to the Mexican Secretary of
Finance that the situation was much more grave than first anticipated. News that some of
the Mexican banks were unable to renew their certificates of deposit held by foreigners
triggered another wave of flight from the peso. The peso continued to slide. Investors pan-
icked, not only those in the Mexican stock market and debt instruments, but also investors
in similar instruments issued by borrowers from countries in the same part of the world or
perceived to be in similar circumstances. Thus began the so-called "tequila effect.'
The tequila effect was induced by two types of factors. First, as perceived risks rose
and expected returns fell, individual investors were persuaded to divest. Second, institu-
tional holders, such as mutual funds faced with actual or threatened redemptions, were led
to liquify their holdings not only of Mexican paper but also of the paper of other coun-
89. The inflation rate between December 1994 and December 1995 was 51.97%. See The Mexican
Economy 1996, supra note 64, Part I.
90. Id.
91. See Lustig, supra note 16, at 53.
92. See Chun, supra note 25, at 2659.
93. Id. Mexican authorities assumed (or rather hoped) that a large portion of the certificates of
deposit would be rolled over. This assumption, however, was not shared by investors. See Lustig,
supra note 16, at 54.
94. International reserves in the Bank of Mexico were approximately $6 billion and the rescue package
was $18 billion. Thus, the rescue package plus the international reserves would have barely covered
half of Mexico's $50 billion in financial obligations for 1995. See Lustig, supra note 16, at 54.
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tries, especially if they could do so while limiting their capital losses.95 The very real possi-
bility of widespread contagion prompted President Clinton to announce on January 11,
1995, that the United States was committed to helping Mexico through what he considered
a short-term crisis.96
Clinton could not allow the Mexican economy to fail since he had invested a consider-
able share of political capital in Mexico's fate with his strong endorsement of NAFTA. A
collapse of the Mexican economy would have transformed the passage of NAFTA from a
stunning, positive achievement into a political embarrassment. Moreover, if Mexico were
to fail, protectionism might resurface. This development would pose a severe setback for
the Latin American countries that had struggled to grow out of their debt under the Brady
Initiative, and for the United States, which had a vested economic interest in the health of
these economies. 97
In an attempt to bridge the immediate crisis and prevent a total economic collapse of
the Mexican economy, Clinton announced on January 12, 1995, a proposal to extend a new
and larger rescue package of $40 billion to Mexico in loan guarantees. 98 The package was
slated for quick congressional approval, with endorsements from congressional leaders
from both parties, the Federal Reserve, and Wall Street.99 However, the bailout quickly
drew controversy. Opposition grew rapidly as populist Democrats, alarmed at the prospect
of further U.S. job losses and shrinking U.S. exports after the peso devaluation, and isola-
tionist Republicans, unsympathetic to NAFTA and Mexico, attached numerous conditions
to the approval of the bailout.'00 Others questioned details and demanded a more com-
plete accounting for the bailout and stronger guarantees for repayment.101 Approval of a
bill that would be acceptable to both the U.S. Congress and the Mexican Government
became increasingly unlikely. Investors reacted to this development with another wave of
capital flight.
Still determined to prevent the collapse of the Mexican economy, Clinton announced
on February 1, 1995, that he would use executive authority to provide Mexico with a new
emergency bailout loan deal including $20 billion in U.S. Treasury emergency stabilization
funds (ESF), 102 $17.8 billion in IMF assistance, $10 billion from the Bank of International
Settlements, $1 billion from Canada, $1 billion in currency swaps from Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, and Colombia, and $3 billion in new loans from commercial banks for a total of
95. See Edwin M. Truman, The Risks and Implications of External Financial Shocks: Lessons from
Mexico 10 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System No, 535, 1996).
96. Clay Chandler & Ted Robberson, Clinton Pledges More Financial Help for Mexico, WASH. POsT,
Jan. 12, 1995 at A19.
97. Perhaps more importantly, registered American voters who had investments in Mexican stocks
and bonds would suffer a potential loss estimated at about $8-10 billion. SeeChun, supra note 25,
at 2660.
98. See Lustig, supra note 16, at 56.
99. See Lovett, supra note 74, at 155.
100. The conditions eventually covered the entire range of bilateral issues: migration, relations with
Cuba, extradition practices, narcotics trafficking, among others. Id.; see also Lustig, supra note 16,
at 56.
101. Tim Carrington & Jackie Calmes, U.S. Rescue Plan for Mexico Prompts Conditions from Both
Liberals, Conservatives in Congress, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 1995, at A20.
102. Congressional approval is not required for U.S. Treasury emergency stabilization funds. See
Lovett, supra note 74, at 155.
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approximately $53 billion. 103 The announcement of the new rescue package halted the
peso's nose-dive. However, the markets remained unstable until the Mexican Government
announced a new economic program on March 9, 1995, which contained more realistic
and plausible targets.
The new package received sharp criticism as well. At the IMF, parties opposed to the
loan argued that IMF funds were being used to bail out risk-taking American mutual and
pension fund managers and some were shocked by the size of the IMF contribution. 104
The IMF contribution was nearly seven times larger than Mexico's quota 105 and three-
and-a-half times more than the IMF had ever lent in its history.10 6 Opponents further cau-
tioned that excessive lending would create moral hazard and establish lending precedents
that the IMF could not meet in the future.
The criticism in the U.S. Congress was even louder. Members of Congress were outraged
that the Clinton Administration had circumvented congressional approval for such a large
financial rescue package. Some representatives argued that the true purpose of the aid was to
rescue wealthy Wall Street investors. 107 Others questioned the wisdom of bailing out Mexico,
a country with a "long and painful past of undisciplined financial mismanagement."1 08
Nevertheless, if Mexico had not obtained international financial support, the depreci-
ation of the peso would likely have been greater, and so would have been the effect on
interest rates, inflation, and the decline in real wages. Moreover, the damage to Mexico's
financial system would have been of greater proportion and the contraction in economic
activity would have been deeper and more protracted. 09
103. Of the total rescue package, $7.8 billion from the IMF standby was made immediately available.
The distribution of the remaining funds was conditioned on Mexico's adherence to certain eco-
nomic conditions and targets. See Lustig, supra note 16, at 58-59.
104. See George Graham et al., Bitter Legacy of Battle to Bail Out Mexico, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1995, at 4;
see also Chun, supra note 25, at 2662.
105. Quotas are the contributions of IMF members to its General Resources Account. In 1995, access
rules to the General Resources Account allowed a country to borrow 100% of its quota with
cumulative limit of 300%. Mexico's quota was about $2.6 billion and thus, the IMF loan was
nearly an unprecedented 700% times greater than Mexico's quota. See Daniel Bradlow, The
International Monetary Fund: Overview of its Structure and Functions, in INTERNATIONAL
BORROWING: NEGOTIATING AND STRUCTURING INTERNATIONAL DEBT TRANSACTIONs 399 (Daniel D.
Bradlow ed., 2d ed. 1986).
106. See Banco de Mexico, The Mexican Economy 1997, III(1)(b) (1997)
<http://www.banixco.org.mx/public-html/doyai/mexecon97/mexecon.html> [hereinafter The
Mexican Economy 19971.
107. See U.S. and International Response to the Mexican Financial Crisis: Hearings Before the U.S. House
Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 104th Cong., 180, 182 (1995) (statement of Jude
Wanniski, president of Polyonomics, Inc.).
108. See U.S. and International Response to the Mexican Financial Crisis: Hearings Before the U.S. House
Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 104th Cong., 215-17 (1995) (statements by Bob Barr
and Carolyn B. Maloney, Representatives).
109. In a speech given in the early part of 1998, President Zedillo applauded the financial assistance
package arranged by the U.S. and multilateral institutions, stating that "it is no exaggeration to
say that their swift and judicious actions averted the risk of a Mexican external default in 1995,
with all its painful consequences for the world economy at large'" See Remarks of President Ernesto
Zedillo Ponce de Leon, President of Mexico, Plenary Session of the World Economic Forum, Davos,
Switzerland (Jan. 31,1998) <http://barracuda.iweb.com.mxlmib/s/lpolit.html>.
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The rescue package, although generous, was not without terms and conditions. The
terms of the $20 billion U.S. package were formalized in the "U.S.-Mexico Framework
Agreement for Mexican Economic Stabilization" (Framework Agreement) signed on
February 21, 1995, which governs the U.S. loan and loan guarantees package for Mexico. 110
.Under the Framework Agreement, Mexico committed itself to comply with the IMF
program and additional requirements set by the U.S. Treasury."I' In particular, the
Mexican Government agreed to refrain from intervening in the foreign exchange market
using international reserves, but rather to stabilize the peso using indirect fiscal and mone-
tary policy. The Mexican Government further agreed to disclose information regularly on
a number of variables and policy decisions in a systematic and transparent way and pro-
ceed with structural reforms. 112 In connection with the Framework Agreement, the U.S.
Treasury created the "Mexico Task Force," whose purpose was to monitor Mexico's econo-
my and economic policy making. "13
PART TWO
THE MEXICAN RESPONSE
In response to the financial crisis, the Mexican Government implemented several
measures designed to alleviate the difficulties faced by financial intermediaries and help
avoid systemic repercussions. These measures were aimed at achieving the goals of pre-
serving the integrity of the real sector of the economy and strengthening the financial sys-
tem. The different schemes to support the banking system and indebted bank clients were
developed with the following principles in mind: (1) prevent systemic risk; (2) protect the
legitimate interests of depositors and other bank creditors; (3) help debtors strained by the
macroeconomic crisis; (4) resist pressures to bail out the stockholders of financial institu-
tions; (5) avoid expansion of the central bank's credit; (6) minimize the fiscal costs of the
crisis management; (7) interfere as little as possible with the normal functioning of the
markets; (8) minimize incentives which can lead to moral hazard problems; and (9) imple-
ment simple and transparent programs which foster confidence. 14
110. The terms specify that disbursements can take place for one year and can be renewed once for six
months. Since the use of the ESF money required an assured source of repayment, the Mexican
Government agreed to deposit the proceeds of oil export sales by PEMEX into a special account
at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The agreement was formalized in the "Oil Facility
Agreement" found in Annex A of the Framework Agreement. See Lustig, supra note 16, at 59-61.
111. This agreement may be found in Annex C of the Framework Agreement entitled, "Economic
Policy Memorandum." Id. at 61.
112. Id.
113. See Department of the Treasury, Semi-Annual Report to Congress by the Secretary of the Treasury
Pursuant to the Mexican Debt Disclosure Act of 1995 (visited Aug. 5, 1996)
<http://www.ustreas.gov/treasury/mexico/semi626.htm>.
114. See The Mexican Economy 1996, supra note 64, at IV(2)(a).
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I. Short-term Initiatives.
A. THE MACROECONOMIC AUSTERITY PROGRAM.
Almost immediately after the devaluation, the Mexican Government began the imple-
mentation of another painful austerity plan. On January 3, 1995, the government
announced a new emergency economic agreement designed to restore financial stability,
strengthen public finances, assist the banking sector, regain confidence, and reinforce the
foundations for long-term sustainable growth. 115
The plan was not successful in preventing foreign investors from continuing to with-
draw their funds from Mexico. 116 This prompted the government to announce a new eco-
nomic plan on March 9, 1995 of monetary, fiscal, banking, and social measures. The plan
contained stringent economic policy adjustments consistent with agreements reached with
the United States and the IMF. The main objectives of the new plan were to contain infla-
tion and reduce the current account deficit. In contrast to previous plans, the new plan was
not accompanied by a Pacto between the Mexican Government, business, and labor. 117
The plan consisted of several elements dealing with monetary, exchange rate, fiscal,
and social policies. In order to stabilize the exchange market, the plan entailed a twenty
percent reduction in the domestic money supply in real terms through higher interest rates
and increased financial regulation. 118 The floating exchange rate policy, adopted by neces-
sity in December 1994, was maintained. The government ruled out any measures to limit
currency convertibility because of the negative effect it would have had on Mexico's
attempts to access the capital markets in the future. 119
Mexico adopted several new fiscal policy measures in accordance with IMF guidelines.
These measures included: (1) an increase in the value-added tax; (2) a reduction in bud-
getary outlays equal to 1.6 percent of GDP for fiscal year 1995; (3) an immediate tax
increase on gasoline and diesel fuel, and an increase in electricity prices; and (4) an
increase in the fiscal surplus of 2.1 percent of GDP.120
Finally, Mexico made several changes to its social policies. Minimum wages were
115. See MExIco's FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 77, at 133.
116. Some of the economic projections incorporated into the program, such as maintaining a current
account deficit of $14 billion and reducing the expected rate of GDP growth from 4% to 1.5 to
2% for 1995, were not viewed as credible by international investors. Id. at 133-34.
117. Although the government wanted to obtain the endorsement of the plan from the members of
the old Pacto, its efforts to do so were unsuccessful because they disagreed with the austerity
measures. Id. at 134.
118. According to the Federal Reserve, Mexico's monetary program was intended to target a particular
growth rate of net domestic assets, which, given flat net international reserves, would produce a
particular growth rate of the nominal monetary base. The extent of real reduction in the mone-
tary base would then depend on inflation. Id.
119. The mere hint that a country might impose exchange controls can preclude it from access to
international capital markets because mutual fund managers cannot tolerate the possibility that
they might be prevented from quickly dumping their holdings and shifting them elsewhere. See
Cynthia Lichtenstein, The Mexican Crisis, Who Should Be a Country's Lender of Last Resort? 18
FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1769, 1775 (1995).
120. See MExico's FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 77, at 135.
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increased by ten percent in addition to a previously announced increase of seven per-
cent. 12 1 Other measures included an extension in health benefits for unemployed workers
from two to six months and a rural employment program. 122
B. LIQUIDITY PROGRAMS.
1. Dollar Liquidity Facility.
In the immediate aftermath of the peso devaluation, Mexican banks encountered
extreme difficulty in renewing their maturing dollar obligations. Mirroring the govern-
ment's tesabono difficulties, commercial banks discovered that their CD depositors and
other lenders were unwilling to roll over their investments. The Banco de Mexico respond-
ed in early January by establishing a special dollar liquidity facility whereby FOBAPROA
provided short-term, twenty-eight-day dollar loans to enable banks to pay all foreign cur-
rency liabilities as they came due.1 23 The purpose of the dollar liquidity facility was to
stop, and eventually reverse, the run on the external liabilities of commercial banks.
In order to encourage commercial banks to substitute the loans with private sector
funding at the earliest possible time, FOBAPROA charged interest on the loans of up to
twenty-five percent and required the loans to be secured by government securities, debt
securities of Nacional Financiera, S.N.C. (the state development bank), or equity securities
of the recipient bank. 124 To further encourage the prompt repayment of these loans, it was
established that early repayment of even a portion of the loans would reduce the interest
charged on a portion of the outstanding balance.
2. Peso Liquidity Facility.
Mexican banks also found it difficult to maintain their peso funding. Banks' increas-
ing need for pesos to buy dollars to retire maturing dollar-denominated CDs caused inter-
bank peso lending rates to rise substantially. Smaller banks were put under additional pres-
sure as their depositors transferred peso deposits to larger and presumably sounder insti-
tutions in a "flight to quality."
Acting as lender of last resort, the Banco de Mexico addressed the problem by providing
short-term peso credit through special credit auctions. Credit was initially provided on an
unsecured basis for banks that were experiencing a shortage of collateral. However, to ensure
that liquidity provision did not become a means to delay recognition of insolvency, the
Banco de Mexico began requiring banks after March 20, 1995, to post government securities,
securities of National Financiera, and loans provided to prime borrowers as collateral. 125 By
121. However, because the two increases were well below the projected inflation rate of 42%, real
wages were projected to decline. Id. at 136.
122. Id.
123. Dollar financing under this program was extended to 17 commercial banks. At its peak in April
1995, the outstanding credit granted through the dollar liquidity facility had reached $3.9 billion.
By September 1995, however, all dollar-denominated advances had been repaid as banks took
advantage of renewed access to international financial markets. See The Mexican Economy 1996,
supra note 64, IV(2)(c)(iii); see also Mancera, supra note 22, at 233.
124. See Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra note 20, at 35.
125. Id.
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March 31, 1995, outstanding balances stood at the equivalent of $3 billion, with most estab-
lished banks participating in the auctions at some point. 126 After the immediate crisis had
subsided, banks were able to obtain peso liquidity from private money markets and no
longer required the assistance of the Banco de Mexico for peso liquidity.
C. TEMPORARY CAPITALIZATION PROGRAM (PROCAPTE).
The devaluation of the peso drastically increased the domestic currency value of bank
loans denominated in foreign currency, causing the capital-asset ratios of many Mexican
banks to fall below the accepted level. 127 To remedy this situation, the government intro-
duced the Temporary Capitalization Program (Programa de Capitalizacion Temporal or
PROCAPTE) in February 1995 to assist the banks that had capitalization levels below the
internationally accepted standard of eight percent of risk-weighted assets. This program
was administered on a voluntary basis and was intended for use by viable banks that were
facing short-term capital needs, rather than by problem banks requiring intervention. 128
Using resources obtained from the Banco de Mexico, FOBAPROA purchased subordi-
nated convertible debentures from participating banks in amounts sufficient to raise the
banks' ratio of net capital-to-risk-weighted assets to nine percent. To prevent unwarranted
expansion of the Banco de Mexico's net domestic credit, the commercial banks were
required to deposit the resources thus obtained in an account at the Banco de Mexico. 129
Interest rates on the deposits were fixed to match the rates on the debentures to avoid neg-
atively affecting the banks' income statements. While the debentures remained outstand-
ing, participating banks were required to maintain a capital ratio of at least nine percent
and were restricted from paying dividends or issuing new equity or subordinated debt. 130
Banks operating under PROCAPTE were kept under strict supervision by the CNBV.
If a participating bank's capitalization ratio fell below 8.5 percent, FOBAPROA had discre-
tion to approve additional subordinated convertible debentures to restore the bank's nine
percent capitalization ratio. If a bank failed to repay the debt within five years, FOBAPROA
could convert the debentures into equity capital of the bank, thereby becoming an owner
of the bank. 131 In addition to converting shares that were not repaid within five years, the
convertibility feature could be invoked earlier if a participating bank's capital deteriorated
to below 2 percent of its risk-weighted assets, or if the bank's capitalization, excluding the
PROCAPTE obligations, varied more than 25 percent from the trend of average capitaliza-
tion of all the banks participating in the program. 132 If a bank's capitalization ratio
improved to exceed nine percent, however, the bank was rewarded by attaining the right to
redeem in advance all or part of the subordinated debentures held by FOBAPROA.
126. Id.
127. See The Mexican Economy 1996, supra note 64, IV(2)(c)(ii).
128. Although the program was voluntary, a bank which did not recapitalize faced suspension or
revocation of its operating charter. See MEXIco's FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 77, at 144.
129. See Camdessus, supra note 7, at 221.
130. See Fluckiger, supra note 28, at 80.
131. Under no circumstances would the government retain any ownership interest in the banks. In
keeping with its commitment to financial liberalization, the government was eager to demon-
strate to the markets that it had no intention of renationalizing any banks, however weak. See
Ayer, supra note 18, at 8.
132. See Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra note 20, at 38.
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The program allowed banks a relatively long time to obtain fresh capital and pay their
debts to FOBAPROA. At the same time, the program provided incentives to the banks to
recapitalize as promptly as possible through the threat of dilution of interest or even total
loss of investment presented by the mandatory conversion of the debentures after the five-
year period. 133 Indeed, faced with the mere possibility of having to rely on PROCAPTE's
resources, some banks made an immediate effort to obtain capital on their own. 134
Moreover, many participating banks were anxious to leave the program as soon as possible
due to the stigma that the market attached to these banks in the form of higher interbank
rates for funds. 135
By the end of March 1995, six banks had entered into the PROCAPTE program,
including Mexico's third largest bank, Serfin. 136 However, by June 1995, all participating
banks except one had exited the program by injecting new capital from shareholders in
return for the purchase of non-performing assets by FOBAPROA. 137 The program had a
positive effect on depositor confidence. The effect on future profitability, however, has
been less than positive because of the high level of subordinated debt in the composition
of the banks' capital.138
D. DEBTOR PROGRAMS.
According to literature published by the Banco de Mexico, all of the programs in sup-
port of debtors were designed with the following objectives in mind: (1) to foster responsi-
ble payment practices among debtors; (2) to carry incentives for banks to grant additional
credit to certain sectors which the programs were designed to help and thereby contribute
towards economic recovery in those sectors; (3) to limit financial support to small debtors
and to limit the extent of support; (4) to structure the cost of the programs so that they be
shared equally between banks and the Federal Government; and (5) to structure the pro-
gram to have no monetary impact. 139
1. Debt Restructuring Program (UDI).
The rapid devaluation of the peso led to a substantial increase in inflation rate dur-
133. See The Mexican Economy 1996, supra note 64, IV(2)(c)(ii).
134. Id.
135. SeeAyer, supra note 18, at 8.
136. The other five banks were Inverlat, Bital, Confia, Centro, and Oriente. The average capitalization
ratio of these banks had declined from 8.13% at the end of 1994 to 5.82% by the end of February
1995. Collectively, the six banks issued $NP 6.5 billion of convertible subordinated debentures to
the government which enabled them to raise their average capitalization ratios to 9.6%. See
Fluckiger, supra note 28, at 80; see also Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra note 20, at 39.
137. A seventh capital-deficient bank, Probursa, was given additional time to meet the minimum cap-
ital requirements in anticipation of an agreement by Banco Bilbao Vizcaya to make a substantial
capital infusion and convert Probursa into an affiliate. See Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra note 20,
at 39.
138. Six of the healthy banks had subordinated debt totaling more than $NP 7 million, equivalent to
13% of their total capital. SeeAyer, supra note 18, at 9.
139. See The Mexican Economy 1997, supra note 106, at III(2)(a).
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ing 1995.140 Mexico responded to this problem by introducing an inflation-indexed unit
of account for financial transactions called the Unidad de Inversion (UDI) on April 1,
1995. Under the program, both new transactions and pre-existing loans can be denomi-
nated in UDIs.
The UDI is designed to be a constant value unit of account used to denominate cred-
its. The value of the UDI is updated daily by the Banco de Mexico to reflect the behavior of
the consumer price index. The value of credits denominated in UDIs remains constant in
real terms with regard to both principal and interest so that the credits are protected
against the accelerated amortization caused when high inflation eats away at the
principal. 14 1 Lenders are thus guaranteed a rate of return in excess of inflation while bor-
rowers are shielded from interest rate volatility. 142
Under the program, the banks' loan portfolios are transferred to special purpose off
balance sheet trusts, administered by the banks themselves, that restructure the loans and
denominate them in UDIs. 143 To carry out the restructuring, the trusts obtain loans from
the government, also denominated in UDIs. In exchange for their loan portfolios, com-
mercial banks receive long-term government bonds that pay interest only at maturity.
Through the restructuring, commercial banks' peso-denominated liabilities are matched
by assets in the same currency. The banks are required to keep the trusts adequately provi-
sioned and to assume the credit risk of the loans in the UDI portfolio.
The government ends up with domestic currency-denominated liabilities (the bonds
acquired by banks) and UDI-denominated assets (the loans to the trusts). Consequently,
the government bears the risk that the interest rates charged on its UDI loans will be lower
than the real interest rates it pays on the aforementioned bonds, while the commercial
banks bear the credit risk. 144
Unfortunately, the complexity of the UDI program led to problems with its imple-
mentation. Both bank officials and borrowers had great difficulty understanding the eco-
nomic effects of the new unit of account. 145 Since banks were initially slow to make full
use of the UDI program, the government was forced to intervene to facilitate the restruc-
turing of a large number of viable loans and encourage their redenomination in UDIs.
Although the program was a disappointment initially, borrowers and banks in non-mort-
140. During periods of high inflation, the value of a loan's principal remains constant in nominal
terms but not real terms. In fact, inflation causes the real value of the principal to continuously
deteriorate. Generally, the creditor charges a high rate of interest to compensate for the erosion of
real value of the principal. Thus, except when highly negative real interest rates prevail (e.g., when
the inflation rate is higher than the interest rate), the real amortization will be paid by debtors
through interest payments. These higher interest payments, in turn, reduce the likelihood that a
bank's loan portfolio will continue to perform. See Mancera, supra note 22, at 234; see also
Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra note 20, at 41.
141. See The Mexican Economy 1996, supra note 64, IV(2)(c)(vi).
142. The UDI program further eases debt burdens by extending loan maturities. Participants are
granted a variety of grace periods and terms permitting maturities of up to 12 years. See Ayer,
supra note 18, at 12.
143. See Mancera, supra note 22, at 235.
144. Id.
145. The response, however, to the program from the mortgage lenders and borrowers was over-
whelming. Mortgage borrowers generally had a greater understanding of the UDI program due
to their previous experience with indexed instruments in connection with mortgage loans.
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gage lending areas eventually caught on to the program's benefits. By the end of 1996,
approximately $NP 167 billion of the loan portfolio had been restructured in UDIs to the
benefit of approximately 375,000 debtors. 146
2. Debtor Relief Program (ADE).
After the initial shock of the first few months of the crisis had passed, and once inter-
est rate volatility began to subside, the government turned its attention toward relieving
the debt burden of consumers created by high interest rates and the substantial decrease in
economic activity. The government and the banks were equally anxious to encourage
enterprises and consumers to reach agreement with lenders and return to servicing non-
performing loans. 147
In August 1995, the Mexican Government introduced the Agreement of Immediate
Support of Bank Debtors (Acuerdo de Apoyo Inmediato a Deudores de la Banca or ADE)
targeted at consumer, credit card, small business, agricultural, and mortgage loan
debtors.148 The ADE was intended to assist debtors in remaining current on their loans,
thereby reducing the systemic risk to the banking system stemming from widespread
default. Within this framework, the government shared losses with banks, seeking to mini-
mize fiscal costs and distribute them over time, while preventing further distortions in
credit markets.149
Borrowers wishing to be eligible for the program were required to sign a letter of intent
by October 31, 1995, to renegotiate their debts with creditors. The signing of the letter of
intent obligated the lending bank to refrain from instituting legal proceedings against delin-
quent debtors until January 31, 1996, and to waive all accrued penalty interest.15 0 Interest
rates payable by the borrower were capped for the year of the program's duration
(September 1, 1995 to September 1, 1996) at 38.5 percent for credit card balances, thirty-
four percent for consumer loans and twenty-five percent for commercial loans. 151 The pro-
146. Market volatility during October and November 1995 required authorities to extend the UDI
program in an effort to reduce the negative impact of interest rates on banks' fourth quarter
results. The limit on the size of foreign currency loans available for restructuring was raised to $2
billion and the deadline for the commercial loan UDI restructuring program was extended.
Additionally, authorities increased funding for the UDI mortgage program by 12,000 UDIs,
which represents a 28.6% increase over the original amount. See Fluckiger, supra note 28, at 81;
see also Mancera, supra note 22, at 235.
147. See Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra note 20, at 42.
148. The program was intended to preempt more extreme measures being promoted by certain bor-
rower pressure groups and to foster responsible payment practices by providing viable borrowers
with interest relief and a legal truce. Id.; see also The Mexican Economy 1996, supra note 64,
IV(2)(c)(vii).
149. Importantly, the program has entailed no monetary expansion since the subsidy provided by the
ADE program was financed through the issuance of bonds to the commercial banks rather than
through the lending of funds. Furthermore, the ADE program has helped to improve the quality
of commercial banks' loan portfolios, and has induced payment discipline and reductions in
required provisions. See Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra note 20, at 42. See also Mancera, supra note
22, at 236.
150. See Fluckiger, supra note 28, at 81.
151. Mortgage loans restructured into UDIs were capped at UDI + 6.5%. See Karaoglan & Lubrano,
supra note 20, at 42.
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gram was intended to bridge the gap between what borrowers were willing to pay and what
lenders were willing to accept.' 52
Participation in the ADE program was extensive. The program enabled seventy-five
percent of borrowers from Mexican banks to completely refinance their debts.15 3 The cost
of the interest rate subsidy was split evenly between the banks and the government and
was much lower than had been initially anticipated. 154
3. Other Debtor Programs.
Although the UDI and ADE programs helped tremendously by providing liquidity to
banks and preventing a wave of defaults by borrowers, further assistance was necessary. To
provide extra assistance in certain critical areas, the Mexican Government implemented a
number of additional support programs.
Because existing bankruptcy laws and procedures were inadequate to enable a "work
out" between insolvent shareholders and their creditors, the Mexican Government estab-
lished the Coordinating Unit for Bank-Enterprise Agreements (Unidad Coordinadora para
Creditos Corporativos or UCABE) in December 1995 to lay the foundation for the financial
restructuring of large corporate debtors.1 55 Although the banks' largest debtors (with
loans totaling between $150 to $500 million) accounted for only eight to ten percent of
total bank lending, the program nevertheless had a positive impact on reducing the overall
debt burden. 156 By year-end 1996, thirty-one loans were restructured by UCABE, for a
total of $2.57 billion. Additionally, seven large firms resolved their payment-suspension
situations with the help of UCABE.
The government launched a mortgage subsidy program (Programa de Beneficios
Adicionales a los Deudores de Creditos para Vivienda) to ease mortgage borrowers' heavy
burden stemming from high interest rates and reduced purchasing power. As a result of
the recession, property values fell, in many cases below the remaining balance on the mort-
gage loans. Under such circumstances, mortgage debtors lost the incentive to remain cur-
rent on their payments. Defaults occurred even with mortgage loans restructured under
the UDI program.
The program contains several key components designed to encourage mortgage
debtors to avoid default. First, a thirty percent discount was made available on payments
due in 1996, which will gradually decline to five percent in 2005 and applies only to the
first 500,000 UDIs of the total loan. 157 Second, the amount available to restructure mort-
gages in UDIs was increased by 43,000 million UDIs, to a total of 100,000 million UDIs
152. The government planned to absorb up to 16 percentage points on the difference between the
concessional interest rate, which varied depending upon the class of debtor and type of loan, and
the market reference rate. If such limit had been surpassed, commercial banks would have borne
half of the additional cost. Id. See also Mancera, supra note 22, at 237.
153. SeeAyer, supra note 18, at 13.
154. The government reimbursed the full amount of the ADE subsidy, in cash rather than bonds,
from November 1995 to January 1996 to alleviate liquidity and interest margin pressures stem-
ming from market volatility.
155. SeeAyer, supra note 18, at 13.
156. Id.
157. See The Mexican Economy 1997, supra note 106, III(2)(a)(ii).
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(about $22.3 billion as of mid-January 1997).158 Third, a scheme of minimum payments
equivalent to rent was introduced to help mortgage debtors that, notwithstanding the ben-
efit of the discount, were unable to service their loans.15 9
The agricultural sector was particularly affected by the economic crisis. In July 1996,
the government introduced the Agricultural, Livestock, and Fisheries Loan Support
Program (Acuerdo para el Financiamiento del Sector Agropecuario y Pesquero or FINAPE), a
loan restructuring mechanism designed to provide debt relief to Mexican farmers, fisher-
men, and ranchers. 160 The mechanism provided discounts of up to forty percent, depend-
ing on the amount of the outstanding loan and the lending banks' willingness to forgive
part of the loan. 161 As with other support programs, the cost of the discounts were shared
between the government and banks. But since the program also sought to promote flows
of new financial capital to the agricultural sector, the cost borne by the government
depended on the amount of new resources that banks injected into the sector.
Small and medium-sized firms also encountered difficulty in coping with the eco-
nomic crisis. In August 1996, the government launched the Support Program for Small
and Medium Sized Firms (Acuerdo de Apoyo Financiero y Fomento a la Micro, Pequeha y
Mediana Empresa or FOPYME) to help alleviate the heavy financial burden faced by small-
er, but viable, firms and to help them finance their current activities. Discounts under the
program ranged from seventeen to thirty percent depending on the amount of the out-
standing loan. To be eligible, loans were required to be under $NP 6 million and to have
been contracted as of July 31, 1996.162 Banks promoted economic activity under the pro-
gram by providing up to $NP 13 billion in new financing to creditworthy firms. Banks are
committed to maintaining these lines of credit in real terms for at least three years.
II. Long-term Structural Reforms.
A. RELAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT LIMITATIONS UNDER NAFTA.
Under the 1993 amendments to the Law of Credit Institutions, foreign-controlled
commercial banks were subjected to individual and aggregate market share limitations. No
single foreign-controlled bank could represent more than 1.5 percent of the capital of the
Mexican banking system and all foreign banks taken together were limited to eight percent
of the market. 163 NAFTA provided for gradual increases in the aggregate market share lim-
itation until its elimination in the year 2000.
In an effort to encourage more capital investment into the financial system, the
Mexican Government amended its financial sector legislation in February 1995 to permit
158. See Mancera, supra note 22, at 237.
159. Under this scheme, the debtor transfers title to the property as full payment of the loan but
retains the right to repurchase it for up to 6 years. The government bears the cost of the discount
by paying the banks in either cash or 5 year credits bearing an interest rate equal to that on 91-
day cetes treasury bills. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 238.
162. The Mexican Economy 1997, supra note 106, at III(2)(a)(v).
163. NAFTA, supra note 35, Annex VII(B)(2), (5)-Mex.
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foreign individuals and foreign companies as a group to hold up to forty-nine percent of
the voting shares of a Mexican-controlled financial holding company, commercial bank, or
brokerage house. 164 Under prior law, the limit on foreign holdings of shares of Mexican-
controlled commercial banks had been thirty percent.
165
Just as importantly, the financial sector legislation was amended to allow the Ministry
of Finance to waive the limits on market share in NAFTA on a case by case basis in certain
circumstances. 16 6 To encourage well-capitalized foreign financial institutions to merge
with or take over existing Mexican banks, the amendments allowed foreign financial insti-
tutions to buy a controlling stake in existing Mexican commercial banks as long as the
resulting foreign-controlled bank had no more than 6% market share. 167 The amend-
ments also raised the aggregate market share ceiling by restricting foreign-controlled banks
to twenty-five percent of the aggregate capital in the banking system. The new limits were
designed to allow mergers or takeovers of smaller institutions while placing the three
largest Mexican banks, Banamex, Bancomer, and Serfin, off limits. 168
B. BANK CONSOLIDATION AND RECAPITALIZATION.
1. Interventions and Restructuring.
In February 1995, the Law of Credit Institutions and the Law of Financial Groups
were amended to encourage the intervention and resolution of severely undercapitalized
banks. The amendments to the Law of Financial Groups provided that FOBAPROA could
give "preventative support" to the financial holding company to be channeled to its bank
subsidiary. 169 Collateral for the support was provided by pledging the capital stock of the
financial holding company to FOBAPROA, giving it control over the bank in the event of
the bank's insolvency. 170 The granting of such pledges conveyed to FOBAPROA the
authority to automatically exercise all corporate and ownership rights over the pledged
shares (including voting rights) without needing to execute the pledge. Through the exer-
cise of corporate and ownership rights, FOBAPROA could ensure that existing sharehold-
ers be made to share in the losses incurred by the financial institution.
In 1995, six financial institutions required intervention by the CNBV or required sup-
port through FOBAPROA: Banpais, Banco Obrero, Banco de Oriente, Banco del Centro,
164. Brokerage houses are not subject to market share limitations. See Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra
note 20, at 36.
165. Id.
166. Relaxation of the previous 1.5% individual market share limitation was crucial to permitting the
recapitalization of Probursa by Spain's Banco Bilbao Vizcaya. Id. at 36-37.
167. See Ayer, supra note 18, at 12; see also Mancera, supra note 22, at 235.
168. The 6% limit and the 25% aggregate cap on foreign-controlled banks were added to the amend-
ing legislation during Congressional consideration on the grounds that permitting foreign con-
trol of any of Mexico's three largest banks might compromise the domestic payments system. See
Mike Lubrano, Mexico Amends Financial Sector Legislation to Attract Greater Investment and
Reinforce Supervision, 2 N. AM. CORP. LAw. 4 (1995).
169. See Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra note 20, at 36-37.
170. Pledged shares must be valued at 75% of book value for purposes of calculating the number of
shares required as collateral for the preventative support provided by FOBAPROA. Id. at 37.
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Banco Interestatal, and Banco Inverlat. 17 1 Furthermore, Banco Union and Banca Cremi,
which had been the targets of intervention in 1994, received additional credit in February
1995 from FOBAPROA. 172
In order to contain the costs to the government, the restructuring plan entailed an
incentive framework designed to foster a favorable environment for private investors to
recapitalize the banks through takeovers and mergers. In cases where mergers were not
practical, the government simply liquidated the banks' assets.
2. Mergers/Acquisitions.
Since the outbreak of the crisis, the Mexican banking system has witnessed significant
consolidation through a succession of financial mergers and acquisitions. For example,
Spain's Banco Bilbao Vizcaya took over Mercantile Probursa in May 1995, as well as two
other banks, Cremi and Banco de Oriente, in 1995 and 1996.173 Additionally, Canada's
Bank of Nova Scotia bought a controlling interest in Mexico's Banco Inverlat in 1995, while
the Bank of Montreal bought a sixteen percent stake in Mexico's Bancomer in 1996.174
In October 1996, Spain's Banco Santander announced its intentions to acquire a sev-
enty-five percent interest in Grupo Financiero Invermexico, which owned the fifth largest
bank in Mexico, Banco Mexicano. 175 It marked the sixth purchase of a Mexican bank by a
foreign investor since the crisis began.
More recently, in January 1998, London-based HSBC Holdings PLC agreed to pur-
chase 19.9 percent of Banca Serfin as part of a recapitalization program.' 76 In the same
month, Banco Industrial signed an initial agreement with Far East National Bank, the U.S.
subsidiary of Taiwanese financial group SinoPac, to sell a fifty-one percent stake. Finally, in
May 1998, Mexican authorities formally agreed to allow Citibank de Mexico to purchase a
majority stake in Confia Bank. 177 As a result of the consolidation of the banking system,
the number of national commercial banks has dwindled from eighteen banks prior to the
171. See The Mexican Economy 1996, supra note 64, IV(2)(c)(v).
172. As a result of the intervention, the existing shareholders of the two banks were eliminated as
owners and replaced by FOBAPROA itself to dispose of the institutions as it saw fit. During the
same period, the CNBV ordered an immediate management intervention of Grupo Financiero
Banpais-Asemex after inspections revealed sharply increased past-due loans, a shortage of capital
and irregular related-party transactions. However, the ownership of the bank remained under the
control of the shareholders. Unfortunately, the disposal of banks and the restructuring of indi-
vidual institutions has proceeded more slowly than desired, in part because of a shortage of capi-
tal from "fit and proper" sources. See Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra note 20, at 37; see also Ayer,
supra note 18, at 9.
173. See Banking/Finance/Insurance: Spain's Banco Santander Buys Out Invermexico, MEX. Bus.
MONTHLY, Dec. 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 12545247 [hereinafter Banking/Finance/Insurancel.
174. See id.
175. The transaction injected $425 million in new capital into Banco Mexicano, which will also sell
about $2.36 billion in overdue loans to FOBAPROA. See Department of the Treasury, Monthly
Report by the Secretary of the Treasury Pursuant to the Mexican Debt Disclosure Act of 1995, (last
modified Nov. 20, 1996) <http://www.ustreas.gov/mexico/mex9610.html>.
176. See Rogelio Varela, Mexico's Banking System-4: Renewal of Credit Seen, Dow JONES INT'L NEWS
SERV. Jan. 29, 1998, available in 1998 WL Dow Jones International News Service-Plus database.
177. See Citibank Mexico Unit Buys Confia Bank, RE TERs NEws SERVICE, (May 11, 1998).
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devaluation to the present nine banks. 178 And, of the remaining national commercial
banks, only Banamex, Banorte, and Bancrecer remain 100 percent Mexican-owned.1 79
Buyouts from well-capitalized foreign institutions such as these, provide a partial
solution to the problems of low capitalization and bad loans that plagued Mexican banks
since the crisis began. Bank mergers generally increase efficiencies and economies of scale,
provide the banks with a larger core of savings, and provide banks a larger branch network
in which to operate.
3. Loan Sale/Capitalization Program.
Although measures to provide temporary liquidity and capitalization to troubled
banks helped avoid bank failures in the short-term, it was evident that long-term measures
for bank restructuring and recapitalization were necessary in order to assure the prolonged
soundness of the Mexican banking system. Thus, authorities have begun focusing their
efforts on attracting fresh capital to the banking system.
An agreement between the Mexican Government and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya (BBV) for
the recapitalization of Probursa provided an informal model for an ad hoc program to
restructure and recapitalize other vulnerable Mexican banks. BBV agreed to increase its 20%
stake in Grupo Financiero Probursa to seventy percent, with an aggregate investment of $350
million.180 In exchange for the new capital, FOBAPROA agreed to purchase approximately
$780 million of Probursa's troubled loans, essentially cleansing the bank's balance sheet.181
FOBAPROA purchased the Probursa portfolio with ten-year bonds bearing interest at a rate
equal to that on the twenty-eight-day cetes treasury notes.18 2 Pursuant to the agreement,
Probursa is responsible for administering and collecting the loans on behalf of FOBAPROA.
In July 1995, a variation of the Probursa agreement was reached with Mexico's third
largest bank, Banca Serfin, in which the bank's controlling Mexican shareholder group
agreed to inject additional capital. 183 Serfin was permitted to exit the PROCAPTE pro-
gram by retiring the mandatory convertible subordinated debentures issued under that
program and was able to increase its ratio of net capital to risk-weighted assets from ten
percent at the end of March to eleven percent by the end of July.'8 4 Several other banks,
178. See Rogelio Varela, MEXICO'S BANKING SYSTEM CONTINUES CONSOLIDATING IN 1998, Dow JONES
INT'L NEWS SERV., Jan. 29, 1998, available in 1998 WL Dow Jones International News Service-Plus
database.
179. According to CNBV statistics, at the end of June 1997, foreign capital represented 15.6% of the
Mexican banking system. Id.
180. See Fluckiger, supra note 28, at 80.
181. Id. As a result of this agreement, Probursa's ratio of net capital to risk-weighted assets increased
to 10.1% by the end of July 1995. See Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra note 20, at 40.
182. SeeAyer, supra note 18, at 9.
183. FOBAPROA purchased loans from Serfin totaling more than NP$4.9 billion on the condition
that Serfin's shareholders purchase N$1.24 billion in shares, N$930 million in convertible subor-
dinated bonds, and N$600 million in non-convertible subordinated bonds. In addition to main-
taining responsibility for the administration and collection of the loans, Serfin agreed to share
20% of any losses which the portfolio might have generated, thereby preserving its incentive to
effectively manage the portfolio. See Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra note 20, at 40.
184. Id.
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including Banco Atlantico, 185 took advantage of the program as well. 186
Although each agreement was tailored to suit the particular needs of the banks, they
all shared common characteristics. First, FOBAPROA purchased loans from the banks in
return for a contribution of fresh capital by shareholders, generally at a 2:1 ratio. Second,
loan loss provisions pertaining to the sold portfolio were negotiated between the banks
and FOBAPROA. Third, banks continued to maintain responsibility for administering and
collecting the loans sold. Fourth, banks retained between twenty to twenty-five percent of
the risk on losses from the sold portfolio. Finally, loans were purchased with ten-year
bonds paying the cetes rate for the amount of peso-denominated loans sold and the
LIBOR rate for the amount of dollar-denominated loans sold, and all principal recovered
from the sold portfolio was used to redeem the bonds.' 87
4. Creation of the Asset Valuation and Sale Agency (VVA).
In March 1996, Mexico announced the creation of the Asset Valuation and Sale
Agency (Valuacion y Venta de Activos or VVA), an agency with functions similar to the U.S.
Resolution Trust Corporation. 188 It was charged with the duty of appraising and selling
the assets that FOBAPROA acquired from the banks. The main objectives of the VVA were
to: (1) maximize revenues from the sale of financial assets, real estate, and other property
acquired by FOBAPROA; (2) sell assets through a transparent and open process as quickly
as conditions permit; (3) design formulas to help restructure viable companies; and (4)
promote the development of secondary markets for banks' debt instruments and other
financial and non-financial assets. 189 Due to a shift in government strategy, however, the
VVA was later dissolved. The responsibility for disposing of assets acquired from banks
will now be shifted to the newly created Bank Savings Protection Institute.
C. ESTABLISHMENT OF FUTURES MARKETS.
Derivatives and other financial innovations provide useful vehicles that enable
investors to hedge several types of risks. The Banco de Mexico, realizing that futures mar-
kets are an efficient mechanism for managing and distributing risks and for determining
prices and exchange rates, began actively facilitating their development.
In 1995, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) established a new division, the
Growth and Emerging Markets Division, to provide risk management of emerging market
currencies, equity, and interest rates, including those of Mexico. Today, in addition to cur-
rency forwards and options, the division offers products such as interest rate swaps and
185. Banco Atlantico agreed to sell 2 billion pesos to FOBAPROA in return for new capital injections
from shareholders of 1 billion pesos. See Department of the Treasury, Monthly Report by the
Secretary of the Treasury Pursuant to the Mexican Debt Disclosure Act of 1995, (last modified Dec.
6, 1996) <http://www.ustreas.gov/mexico/mex9611.html>.
186. By the end of 1997, the banking sector had increased its capital by almost 158% over December
1994 levels. See The Mexican Economy 1997, supra note 106, at III(2)(b)(ii).
187. See Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra note 20, at 40.
188. See Banking/Finance/Insurance: Banks Seek to Survive in 1996, MEX. Bus. MONTHLY, Apr. 1, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 8155014.
189. See The Mexican Economy 1997, supra note 106, at III(2)(c)(i).
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forward agreements, credit derivatives, and structured notes. 190
In November 1996, the CNBV inaugurated Mexico's first futures market called the
Mexican Derivatives and Futures Market (Mex-Der). 1 91 The market offers products such
as peso currency forwards and options, interest rate swaps, and IPC index contracts.192
The Ministry of Finance, Banco de Mexico, and CNBV are currently finalizing regulations
to govern the new derivatives market.
A futures market provides an important mechanism for stabilizing over-the-counter
markets; security is the primary benefit. According to Chris Campbell, director of Latin
American Marketing at the CME, a futures exchange has never had a default. 193 Moreover,
a futures exchange entices foreign investment because it provides a method to manage the
types of risk which are common in emerging markets, namely currency risk and interest
rate risk. Domestic futures markets also add a greater level of sophistication to an emerg-
ing market's finance sector.
D. PENSION SYSTEM PRIVATIZATION.
Historically, Mexico has lacked strong internal financing and has continuously experi-
enced a significant leakage of domestic savings to foreign investments. Indeed, the econo-
my's overall savings rate in 1994 fell to just sixteen percent of gross domestic product,
which contributed to Mexico's reliance on short-term foreign capital and to the subse-
quent financial crisis. 194
To rectify this situation, Mexico passed a new Social Security Act (Ley del Instituto
Mexicano del Seguro Social) in late 1995 and the Retirement Savings Systems Act (Ley de los
Sistemas de Ahorro para el Retiro) in April 1996 to privatize the nearly bankrupt govern-
ment social security system. 195 All Mexican workers are required under the new laws to
choose by the year 2001 which private pension fund administrator (called an AFORE) they
wish to look after their pension contributions. 196
Regulations pursuant to the new law include a provision permitting U.S. and
Canadian financial institutions to own equity in AFORES on a basis consistent with the
190. See Ovidio E. Diaz Espino, Emerging Markets Derivatives Set to Expand, in SWAPS AND OrHER
DERIVATIVES IN 1997 669 (Kenneth M. Raisler et al. eds., Practising Law Institute 1997).
191. However, due to the amount of infrastructure required to set up a futures market, the Mex-Der
did not become operational until 1998. See Mexico Derivatives Market Expected to Begin IQ 1998,
Dow JONES INT'L NEWS SERV., Dec. 4, 1997 available in 1997 WL Dow Jones International News
Service-Plus database.
192. Id.
193. See Futures Market Picks Up Steam, SPECIAL REPORT, Bus. TIMES (Singapore), Mar. 1996.
194. See Mexico: January 1998, BARCLAYS BANK COUNTRY REP. 1, Jan. 1, 1998, available in 1998 WL
10591500; see also Private Pension Funds Out to Lure Mexicans, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 4, 1998
[hereinafter Private Pension Funds].
195. The government pension system, run by the notoriously inefficient IMSS, is already $6 billion in
debt and is estimated to be completely bankrupt by 2006. Moreover, the previous pension system
has been criticized as unfair because of the poor correlation between benefits and lifetime contri-
butions. See Luis Cerda, The Mexican Pension Reform (visited Nov. 1, 1998)
<http://www.shcp.gob.midenglish/docs/pension.html>.
196. AFORES are financial institutions whose purpose is to professionally administer individual pen-
sion retirement accounts and to channel these funds into the corresponding sub-accounts in
accordance with the social security laws, as well as to administer specialized retirement mutual
funds, called "SEIFORES." See The Mexican Economy 1997, supra note 106, at III(6)(a).
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NAFTA and thus to participate fully in the management of the pension funds. 19 7
Participation by other foreign institutions is limited to forty-nine percent of the AFORE
capital. Additionally, no individual or corporation may control more than ten percent of
the AFORE stock unless specifically authorized by the National Retirement Fund System
Commission (CONSAR), the pension system regulatory agency.198
The new system gives many Mexicans their first opportunity to participate in financial
markets. Instead of having money taken out of their paychecks, employees will actively
invest in their own retirement. Under the new system, workers' future pension benefits will
be tied directly to their contributions, time spent working, and to their savings. Thus, at
least in theory, a change of perception will be brought about by turning the worker into
the sole owner of his contribution and of the capital that it generates. Currently, AFORES
are restricted to investing in government and domestic corporate bonds within Mexico,
but investment restrictions are expected to be liberalized within a year or two.199 Until
then, the funds will be vulnerable to any major peso devaluations.
Pension privatization is being heralded as a cornerstone of President Ernesto Zedillo's
efforts to deepen Mexico's financial markets, increase the domestic savings rate, and
diminish reliance on foreign capital. 2°° As the pension system grows, the funds accumulat-
ed in individual accounts will broaden the opportunities for the development of the finan-
cial system and will significantly increase the supply of financial resources to the economy.
This, in turn, will promote greater specialization of financial institutions as well as the cre-
ation of new financial instruments related to long-term investments. The long-term nature
of retirement funds will facilitate channeling them to slow-yielding productive investments
such as infrastructure projects.20 1
While not the first pension system to be privatized in Latin America, Mexico's is by far
the largest privatization and will draw the heaviest participation. 20 2 Salomon Brothers esti-
mates that the sector should control $24 billion of investments by the year 2000.203
Response to the program has been overwhelming, as more than eight million workers had
already signed up for the program by mid-September 1997.204
197. Department of the Treasury, Semi-Annual Report to Congress by the Secretary of the Treasury
Pursuant to the Mexican Debt Disclosure Act of 1995, III (last modified Aug. 5, 1996)
<http://www.treas.gov/mexico/semi626.html>.
198. Additionally, in order to prevent any AFORE from obtaining a monopoly of the industry, no
institutions may have a share of the market greater than 17% without authorization from CON-
SAR. See Cerda, supra note 195.
199. See Chris Kraul, Mexicans Rush to Switch Funds to Private Pensions Economy: Marketing Blitz and
Disenchantment with Social Security Fuel Move, Los ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 16, 1997, at Al, available
in 1997 WL 13980468 [hereinafter Mexicans Rush to Switch Funds].
200. See Private Pension Funds, supra note 194; see also Department of the Treasury, December Monthly
Report to Congress: Summaries of the Treasury Secretary's Monthly Reports, July-December, 1996,
(last modified Jan. 10, 1997) <http://www.treas.gov/mexico/mex9612.html>.
201. See The Mexican Economy 1997, supra note 106, III(6)(c).
202. See Mexicans Rush to Switch Funds, supra note 199, at Al.
203. See Private Pension Funds, supra note 194.
204. Responsibility for the enormous response is due in part to an aggressive $135 million advertising
campaign launched by owners of the AFORES hoping to acquire the largest share possible of the
finds from the contributions equaling 8.5% of employees' gross wages. See Mexicans Rush to
Switch Funds, supra note 199, at Al.
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III. Regulatory and Supervisory Reforms.
A. AMENDED LOAN LOSS RESERVE REQUIREMENTS.
New guidelines were announced in March 1995 requiring Mexican banks to implement
more stringent loan loss reserves. Under the guidelines, banks are required to maintain either
reserves for non-performing loans of at least sixty percent of past due loans, or reserves equal
to four percent of the total loan portfolio.205 Prior to the new guidelines, banks were required
only to make quarterly provisions based on self-assessed risk rating categories. The new guide-
lines were prompted by the government's concern that the crisis, and its negative effect on the
majority of Mexican borrowers, was preventing banks from properly provisioning for loans.
As a result of the new guidelines, aggregate loan loss provisions increased substantially from
N$ 24.5 billion at the end of 1994 to N$ 54.1 billion by the end of July 1995.206
B. STRICTER BANK LENDING STANDARDS.
Connected lending, insider dealing, and fraud were major contributors to the instabil-
ityof the Mexican banking system before the crisis. To address these problems, the govern-
ment instituted legislative reforms to prohibit self-lending or "autoprestamos" a practice in
which a bank officer makes loans to himself or a corporation in which he has an equity
interest. 20 7 In the past, self-lending in Mexico was not considered an unethical practice, as
long as bank officers complied with requirements to report all such loans to regulatory
authorities. But with hundreds of millions in losses due to insider dealing at banks, savings
and loans, and leasing firms, the Mexican Government reversed its former policy of giving
bankers the benefit of the doubt regarding the legitimacy of their self-lending
transactions.208
C. ENHANCED SUPERVISION.
A number of steps have been taken to improve financial supervision. In May 1995, the
Law of the National Banking and Securities Commission (Ley de la Comision Nacional
Bancaria y de Valores or CNBV) 20 9 went into effect. The key feature of the law is central-
ized supervision. The National Banking Commission and the Securities Commission were
combined to form the CNBV and, importantly, the staff of the new commission was
strengthened. 2 10
In 1997, the CNBV published an official agenda, entitled the Programa Institucional
1997 2000, which outlines four principle areas for improvement: (1) prudential regulation;
205. See MEXICO'S FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 77, at 145.
206. See Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra note 20, at 38.
207. See Proposed Banking Reform Would Prohibit 'Insider-Lending' Practices, U.S.-MEx. FREE TRADE
REP., Mar. 31, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10175326.
208. The reforms may cause significant problems for some Mexican industrial groups that bought
into banks during the 1991-1992 privatization and do much of their lending to associated indus-
trial groups. See id.
209. "Ley de la Comision Nacional Bancaria y de Valores" D.O., 1 de mayo de 1995 (Mex.).
210. See The Mexican Economy 1996, supra note 64, IV(2)(c)(i).
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(2) supervision; (3) market self-regulation; and (4) corrective actions. 2 11 In order to
address the new challenges presented by Mexico's transition to a universal banking system,
the CNBV developed a consolidated "MACRO" supervision scheme to manage and coor-
dinate on-site inspections and off-site monitoring of financial institutions and to assist in
the evaluation of financial institutions' management of funds, capital adequacy, asset qual-
ity, profitability, and organization. 212
The MACRO scheme significantly changes the method of on-site inspections.
Previously, inspectors were permanently stationed within the financial institution. The
new scheme abolishes that practice in favor of using teams of inspectors stationed outside
the financial institutions to carry out regular on-site inspections. On-site inspectors are
responsible for monitoring the financial institutions' internal control systems for risk-
management, paying particular attention to the institutions' operations, procedures, inter-
nal controls, management, and compliance with rules and regulations. 213
Off-site inspection has been strengthened through the development of the Financial
Analysis System (SAF). The SAF is a computer database that electronically receives the
financial information that institutions must provide to the CNBV, eliminating the need for
physical delivery. The receipt of consistent and uniform financial information allows off-
site inspectors to create individual, comparative, and sectoral analyses concerning the per-
formance of financial institutions and thereby develop early warning mechanisms that
make it possible to detect in a timely manner any atypical behavior, whether individual or
systemic, that may pose risks to the financial position of an institution and to address
those risks before they reach critical levels. 2
14
Additionally, the CNBV is considering a new system of internal and external audits to
complement the supervision of financial institutions. Under the new system, external
auditors must register with the CNBV and be evaluated regularly regarding their perfor-
mance and opinions.2 15 External auditors will also be subject to sanctions for poor perfor-
mance. Internal auditors must report directly to a financial institution's board of directors
rather than the intermediate management of the institution. The CNBV will supervise
internal auditors by examining the scope and regularity of audits, audit procedures, and
the content of internal audit reports. 216
Lastly, to foster market confidence in Mexico's financial institutions, the Institutional
Program calls for the public dissemination of quality financial information, in financial
terms, so that markets may make their own evaluations regarding a Mexican institution's
exposure to risk.
D. ADOPTION OF GAAP ACCOUNTING STANDARDS.
In an effort to improve the quality of information provided to markets by banks and
to improve overall transparency of the financial system, the CNBV issued new regulations
211. See Comision Nacional Bancaria y de Valores, Piograma Institucional 1997-2000, 8
<http://www.cnbv.gob.mx/aspgral/prestrateg.htm> [hereinafter Programa Institucional].
212. See id. at 15.
213. See id. at 16.
214. See id. at 18.
215. See id. at 20.
216. See id. at 19-20.
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in December 1995 giving banks six months to implement accounting standards consistent
with the United States' generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). 2 17 By July 1996,
banks were required to report financial statements to the CNBV under both the old and
new principles. As of January 1, 1997, all financial statements must be reported under the
new standards exclusively.
Mexican institutions' financial statements prior to the adoption of GAAP differed con-
siderably from the United States' and other industrial nations' The areas of divergence
included the valuation of fixed assets, the definition of non-performing assets, and the
treatment of interest income on loans.2 18 These and other differences in the accounting
practices between the two countries led to many complaints that the true nature of the
Mexican banks' asset quality during the months before the devaluation had been disguised.
Under the new accounting requirements, banks must include in their past-due loan
portfolios the total balances of delinquent loans, including past-due, due, and current bal-
ances. 2 19 Once a loan has been classified as past-due, banks may not continue to apply
interest charges. Another important change under the new requirements is that practically
all securities portfolios will be valued at mark-to-market.220 The purpose of the new crite-
rion is to provide a clearer determination of the real value of financial institutions' invest-
ments and, consequently, of their equity.
Reporting financial statements using GAAP accounting standards makes it easier to
compare banks' accounts internationally and makes the accounts more credible in the eyes
of international money markets. Moreover, it is essential to proper credit analysis, the lack
of which contributed greatly to the loan defaults that have plagued banks since the crisis
began. The use of the new principles should also encourage market discipline to become
the basic means for maintaining a healthy financial system.
217. In an explanatory bulletin published at the end of 1995, CNBV President Eduardo Fernandez
outlined the reasons for the changes. "Considering the globalization of the financial markets and
the complexity which some Mexican banking operations have reached in the last years it's neces-
sary to reset the accounting standards, the valuation of assets and liabilities as well as the presen-
tation and publication of financial information of these institutions." See Switch to GAAP Seen To
Clarify Banks' Loan Losses, SPECIAL REPORT, Bus. TIMES (Singapore), Mar. 1996 [hereinafter Switch
to GAAPI.
218. Specifically, using previous Mexican standards, only the missed payment of an installment loan is
classified as past due (after 30 days), while under U.S. GAAP, the loan itself is classified as past
due after 90 days. Additionally, in the United States, interest accrued on loans is discontinued
when it appears likely that the borrower will not be able to make payments. All unpaid interest
accrued is reversed. In Mexico, however, interest is allowed to continue to accrue on loans except
in cases where the entire balance of the underlying loan principal is past due. Unpaid interest
accrued does not have to be reversed. See Ayer, supra note 18, at 13; see also Fluckiger, supra note
28, at 79.
219. The Mexican Economy 1997, supra note 106,111(4). Prior to 1997, past-due loan portfolios includ-
ed only the unpaid amortization of each loan. Thus, the transition to GAAP was particularly bur-
densome for many banks because it had the immediate effect of increasing the ratio of bad loans
to total loans in the banks' portfolios by approximately 24%. See Switch to GAAP, supra note 217.
220. Under a mark-to-market valuation, assets are valued at their current market price rather than
their nominal value. See The Mexican Economy 1997, supra note 106,111(4).
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E. PARTICIPATION IN SDDS.
In March 1996, the Executive Board of the IMF approved an initiative to create the
Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS). This standard seeks to improve the prac-
tices for the dissemination of information by countries participating in international capi-
tal markets. 221 It was established by the IMF in response to lapses in the publication of
economic and financial data prior to the Mexican crisis. Mexico accepted the IMF's invita-
tion to partake in this initiative and collaborate as a pilot country in the implementation of
the first stage of the SDDS. In September 1996, Mexico and seventeen other countries
inaugurated the Dissemination Standards Bulletin Board (DSBB). 222
The SDDS emphasizes four aspects: (1) the coverage, periodicity, and timeliness of
data; (2) public access; (3) integrity of the data; and (4) the quality of data.223 The ratio-
nale behind the SDDS is that informed financial markets are likely to be less volatile, and
that prompt, simultaneous release of government statistics, prepared according to ade-
quate and harmonized standards, will be an antidote to runs by investors caused by leaks,
rumors, and the decision to act on inside information before one's competitor does.224
F. REVISED CAPITAL ADEQUACY VALUATIONS.
As of September 1996, banks are required to adjust their capital adequacy reports to
reflect market risk (changes in share prices, interest rates, exchange rates, and inflation) as
well as credit risk. 225 This change will move Mexico closer to international regulatory stan-
dards, increasing transparency in the system.
G. ENCOURAGEMENT OF CREDIT BUREAU SYSTEM.
In February 1995, the Mexican Government enacted new regulations designed to
encourage the creation of credit bureaus covering areas such as credit card obligations,
auto financing, and mortgages. Prior to the new regulations, only one credit bureau exist-
221. See id. 111(8).
222. The group of subscribing countries included industrialized nations (the United States, the United
Kingdom, Japan, Germany, Italy, France, and Holland), countries "in transition" (Croatia,
Lithuania, Hungary, and the Slovak Republic), and "emerging" economies (Chile, Argentina, the
Philippines, Singapore, Peru, Thailand, and Mexico). See id., n.33. By April 1997, more than 40
countries had subscribed to the SDDS. See id. Every subscribing country must post the main
characteristics of each of 20 selected variables on the DSBB, including the methodology for com-
puting the data, the procedures for publishing the information, the publishing institution, and
the individual responsible for answering any question posed by users. See id. 111(8). Moreover, the
bulletin board must also include a schedule for the release of information indicating the dates on
which the data will be published in the four subsequent months. See id.
223. In order to increase the public's trust in the statistics published on the DSBB, equal access must
be guaranteed to all users, and the clarity and objectivity of the information must be ensured.
Basic statistical information must be published in the real, fiscal, financial, and external sectors.
See id.
224. Cynthia Lichtenstein, The New Financial World of Cross-Border Capital Movements: The
International Monetary Fund Agreement in the Light of the 1994 Mexican Peso Crisis, WAHRUNG
UND WIRTSCHAFT: DAS GELD IM RECHT 197 (Albrecht Weber, ed. 1996).
225. See Monthly Report by the Secretary of the Treasury Pursuant to the Mexican Debt Disclosure Act of
1995, The Department of the Treasury, (visited Oct. 17, 1996)
<http://www.ustreas.gov/treasury/tnews102.html>.
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ed. This credit bureau, owned by a group of the largest Mexican banks, operated only on
behalf of its owners, as banks historically have been unwilling to share credit information
between each other. The lack of a common credit database made it extremely difficult for
Mexican banks to access the information necessary to value new loans or to determine a
potential borrower's creditworthiness. The new regulations outline the procedures for col-
lecting and disseminating consumer credit information as well as the procedures for
applying to the Finance Ministry for operating licenses.
H. 1998 FINANCIAL REFORM LEGISLATION.
The Mexican Government is in the process of implementing significant structural
changes to the financial regulatory agencies. On March 26, 1998, the President of Mexico
presented to Congress a reform package, which included measures to grant the Banco de
Mexico independence on exchange rate decisions, 226 eliminate current limits on foreign
ownership of domestic banks, simplify the shareholder structure of financial groups, create
a limited deposit insurance system, transform the CNBV into a semi-autonomous agency,
and convert all of FOBAPROAs holdings into public debt.2 27
The proposal to modify the shareholder structure of the controlling entities of finan-
cial groups, banks, and brokerage houses entails the issuance of a new, single series of 0
shares to be freely subscribed, thus allowing a broader participation in the institutions by
foreign corporate entities and individuals.228 The legislation also called for the elimination
of the current limitation that restricts foreign-controlled banks from acquiring a control-
ling interest in a bank whose net capital exceeds six percent of the aggregate capital in the
banking system. The elimination of this restriction will make it possible for foreign institu-
tions to acquire controlling interests in Mexico's three largest banks.
Perhaps the most important initiative in the new legislation is the proposal to trans-
form the CNBV into a semi-autonomous entity with increased regulatory and supervisory
powers. Under the proposal, the CNBV will become dependent on the Banco de Mexico
rather than the Ministry of Finance. Since the Banco de Mexico is an autonomous entity,
the CNBV would gain similar autonomy. This reform would dramatically redistribute
financial system supervisory powers from the Ministry of Finance to the Banco de Mexico.
The Ministry of Finance will continue to exercise some influence over the CNBV, however,
since one of six seats on the proposed Governing Board of the CNBV will be filled by the
Secretary of Finance.
Another significant initiative under the new legislation is the creation of a deposit
guarantee fund (FOGADE), which would provide deposit insurance of up to 500,000
226. "Decreto que Reforma ia Ley del Banco de Mexico" 26 de marzo de 1998 (Mex.).
227. See Government Proposes Restructuring Banking Regulatory Agencies, SOURCEMEX ECON. NEws &
ANALYSIS ON MEX., Mar. 18, 1998, available in 1998 WL 8779038.
228. "CNBV Boletin de Prensa;' 24 de marzo de 1998 (Mex.). Under the current structure, voting
shares of commercial banks and brokerage firms are represented by Series "' shares representing
at least 51% of the capital stock and Series "B" shares representing the remainder. The ownership
of Series "A" shares is reserved for Mexican individuals and companies that are majority owned
and controlled by Mexicans. Both Mexican and foreign individuals and corporations may invest
in Series "B" shares.
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UDIs per person in each bank. The new deposit guarantee system would replace the cur-
rent 100 percent implicit guarantee on deposits from FOBAPROA. Deposit protection
would be gradually reduced so that the guarantee system would be in full force no later
than 2008. By limiting guarantees on deposits, the government hopes to strengthen the
financial system by reducing the moral hazard that may result from full deposit protection.
Moody's Investor Service, a credit rating agency, voiced its support for the legislation
in a special comment, which stated that "the progress made by Mexican authorities during
the past three years in terms of the quality of official oversight, if reinforced with energetic
and rigorous implementation of the proposed March 1998 reforms, will move the industry
toward a stable and more efficient banking system " 229 The agency added that without the
reforms, the Mexican banking system could continue to suffer periodic meltdowns.230
The most controversial measure of the legislation proved to be the proposal to elimi-
nate FOBAPROA and to convert its assets into public debt in the form of government
bonds. 23 1 The proposal hit an immediate roadblock in the rebellious lower house of
Congress which has been controlled by the combined opposition parties since 1997.
Opposition leaders strongly criticized the proposal, accusing the government of seeking to
force the common taxpayer to pay the price for lax banking supervision and the corrupt
practices of bankers and wealthy businessmen. Opponents of the proposal also questioned
whether the increase in public debt would hurt economic growth and hamper any efforts
to boost the purchasing power of the peso, ease unemployment and underemployment,
and reduce poverty.232 A tumultuous debate and political stalemate continued in the lower
house for several months. During this period, the level of bad bank loans rose from
approximately 552 billion pesos ($55 billion) on February 28, 1998 to over 640 billion
pesos ($64 billion) by late November.233 Outraged leaders from both the pro-business
National Action Party (PAN) and the leftist Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) called
for the resignation of former Minister of Finance Guillermo Ortiz for his role in the
FOBAPROA bank bailout.
Finally, Congress approved a compromise plan on December 12, 1998 which calls for
the creation of a new Bank Savings Protection Institute to replace FOBAPROA. 234 Under
229. See Moody's Comments on Mexican Bank Credit Strength, MOODY'S INVESTORS SERV., May 4, 1998
[hereinafter Moody's].
230. Moody's has long identified the issue of "moral hazard" that occurs when the government
bailouts become conducive to excessive risk exposure. Measures that would burden even large
depositors with bank risk will go far in addressing this problem. Moody's describes the new
reform proposals as "the culmination of an almost four-year-long journey to reduce moral haz-
ard through structural changes." See id.
231. FOBAPROA has been unable to dispose of much of the debt acquired from troubled banks and
currently has $65 billion in non-performing assets, primarily in real estate and bad loans.
Officials estimate that the government could recover approximately $24.5 billion from the sale of
the bonds. See Mexico's Werner optimistic on financial reform, REUTERS NEWS SERV., May 15, 1998.
232. See Government Introduces Controversial Bank-Reform Legislation, SOURCEMEX ECON. & ANALYSIS
ON MEx., Apr. 15, 1998, available in 1998 WL 8779051.
233. See Caroline Brothers, Bank Rescue Stalemate Boosts Costs to $64 Bln-Gurria, REUTERS NEWS SERv.,
Nov. 26, 1998.
234. See Brendan M. Case, Mexican Parties Back Bank Bailout Amid Debtors' Protests, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, December 13, 1998.
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the compromise plan, FOBAPRO.Ks liabilities will not be immediately assumed as public
debt. Instead, the liabilities will be financed each year as a separate category in the federal
budget. In addition, the plan calls for a team of auditors hired by Congress to perform
detailed audits of the liabilities in early 1999 to determine which loans are tainted with
fraud or other improprieties.2 35 Those loans that are found to be tainted by fraud will be
returned to the banks that originally issued them.
PART THREE
ASSESSMENT OF MEXICO'S REFORMS
I. Successes.
In many respects, the support programs and legal reforms adopted by the Mexican
Government conform to what are generally considered to be "best practices" for dealing
with bank crises.236 In particular, Mexican authorities responded quickly in arranging the
support and liquidity packages to stem the massive outflow of capital. Furthermore, regu-
lators were able to successfully constrain the growth of impaired institutions without
resorting to inflationary financing to resolve banks.
Additionally, Mexico has made significant progress in the areas identified by a special
Working Party formed by the Group of Ten 237 as "key indicators" of a robust financial sys-
tem.238 For example, Mexico has considerably improved its accounting practices and dis-
closure techniques. The switch to GAAP was a particularly meaningful achievement as it
will now enable markets to see a more realistic picture of the financial condition of
Mexican banks. Participation in the SDDS program is also important because it gives mar-
kets the ability to monitor on a daily basis the condition of the Mexican financial system
on an aggregate level, as well as monitor the activities of the Mexican financial regulatory
authorities. One of the chief criticisms expressed by the markets after the crisis began was
235. Id.
236. For an in-depth discussion of "best practices" for dealing with bank crises, see Liliana Rojas-
Suarez & Steven R. Weisbrod, The Do's and Don'ts of Banking Crisis Management, BANKING CRISES
IN LATIN AMERICA 121 (Ricardo Hausmann & Liliana Rojas Suarez, eds., 1996).
237. The Working Party was made up of representatives from the Group of Ten countries and of
emerging market economies, including Mexico. In the course of the work, the working party
consulted officials from the Basle Committee, the IMF, IOSCO, the World Bank, and other inter-
national organizations with expertise in financial matters.
238. The key elements of a robust financial system outlined by the G-10 Working Party are: (1) a
sound and well-developed legal and juridical framework; (2) comprehensive and well-defined
accounting practices and disclosure techniques; (3) improved stakeholder oversight and institu-
tional governance; (4) a market structure that favors free competition and promotes the efficient
use of resources and the maximization of returns; (5) a financial regulatory and supervisory sys-
tem designed to support and enhance market functioning, rather than displace it, by promoting
the integrity of the market infrastructure and fostering the efficient operation of the financial
system; and (6) a financial safety net designed to minimize moral hazard. See Group of Ten, supra
note 6, at 74-76.
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that the Banco de Mexico's practice of providing information only on a quarterly basis dis-
guised the true nature of its dwindling foreign reserves between quarterly reports.
Mexico has also made progress in creating a market structure that favors free competi-
tion and promotes the efficient use of resources. The relaxation of the limits on foreign
ownership of Mexican financial institutions has heightened competition by reducing bar-
riers to market entry. Moreover, foreign bank owners from developed financial systems
have promoted the use of advanced and efficient market practices by their Mexican affili-
ates and this has had a positive effect on the Mexican financial system as a whole.
In addition to promoting disclosure and free competition, Mexico has made
improvements in stakeholder oversight and institutional governance and has taken mea-
sures to strengthen its regulatory and supervisory system by giving it increased indepen-
dence and authority to impose penalties on wrongdoers.
A. POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS.
Several important developments since the first quarter of 1995 provide convincing
evidence that Mexico's financial system has emerged from the crisis and is now beginning
the process of transformation into a robust financial system. A particularly noteworthy
development was that Mexico regained access to international capital markets in the sec-
ond quarter of 1995, only five months after the December 1994 devaluation. This was in
sharp contrast to the aftermath of the 1982 crisis, when Mexico needed almost seven years
in order to tap capital markets again. 239
According to a report by the Ministry of Finance, growth dynamics during 1997 con-
firmed that the economic recovery had been consolidated. 240 Moreover, real GDP grew
seven percent in 1997, the strongest performance since 1981.241 The report gave a very
favorable outlook for 1998, predicting GDP growth at five percent in real terms, a current
account deficit completely financed by foreign direct investment, and a continued com-
mitment by the government to sound public finances. 242
Financial and foreign exchange markets have been substantially more stable since 1995.
Annual inflation maintained a clear downward trend, from 51.9 percent in 1995 to 27.7 per-
cent in 1996, and then to 15.7 percent in 1997.243 The reduction in inflationary pressures
239. See The Mexican Economy 1996, supra note 64, Part I.
240. Economic growth was mainly financed through domestic savings, which reached 21.9% of GDP
in 1997. See Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico, Mexico Quarterly Report: Fourth Quarter
1997 (visited Nov. 1, 1998) <http://www.shcp.gob.mx/english/docs/qr97/qr497.html> [here-
inafter Mexico Quarterly Report).
241. Furthermore, in contrast to 1981, last year's economic expansion was accompanied by a signifi-
cant decrease in inflation and higher domestic savings. Significantly, domestic demand (con-
sumption and investment) was featured as the main engine of economic activity. See Jose Angel
Gurria Trevino, Address at the Economic Club of New York (visited Mar. 11, 1998)
<http://www.shcp.gob.mx/english/docs/pr980312.html>.
242. See Mexico Quarterly Report, supra note 240. However, Mexico's economy is beginning to feel the
negative effects from the current financial crisis in Asia. As a result, recent estimates of GDP
growth for 1998 have been adjusted downward to 4.2%. See Mexico's Canacintra Revises down
1998 GDP estimate, REUTERS NEWS SERV., July 1, 1998.
243. See The Mexican Economy 1997, supra note 106, at l(1); see also Mexico: January 1998, BARCLAYS
BANK COUNTRY REP. 1, Jan. 1, 1998, available in 1998 WL 10591500 [hereinafter Mexico: January
19981.
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since March 1995 has induced a downward trend in interest rates, which has been interrupt-
ed only by temporary setbacks. Whereas in mid-March 1995 the interbank twenty-eight-day
interest rate was 110 percent, a year later it had declined to forty-six percent, and at year-end
1997 it closed at 20.4 percent.244 Real interest rates (adjusted for inflation) moved in the
same direction. For example, in 1995, the average interbank twenty-eight-day rate was 11.6
percent, whereas in 1996 it declined to 9.4 percent, both in real terms. 245
The volatility of the peso-dollar exchange rate has been considerably reduced since
1995. In fact, based on a sample taken in 1996 of twelve major currencies under floatation
regimes vis-A-vis the U.S. dollar, the Mexican peso exchange rate was the second-least
volatile.246 Moreover, Banco de Mexico's international reserves have risen considerably
since the peso devaluation, reaching the level of $30.14 billion as of December 31, 1998,
slightly higher than the pre-crisis peak of $29.2 billion in February 1994.247
Mexico has demonstrated its creditworthiness by repaying the funds lent to it by the
United States and the IMF in 1995 ahead of schedule. On January 17, 1997, Mexico pre-
paid the remaining outstanding balance of $3.5 billion owed to the United States under the
Financial Assistance Package granted to Mexico at the onset of the financial crisis. 248 The
repayment ahead of schedule also saved the Mexican Government a significant amount of
money in interest.
Not only has Mexico paid off its external debt, it has made a meaningful reduction in
the debt incurred from the various financial support programs implemented since the cri-
sis began. By year-end 1997, nearly one-fifth of the cost of the financial support programs
(71.3 billion pesos in net present value) had already been covered. 249
Finally, the international financial community appears to have given the Banco de
Mexico its seal of approval. 250 In its reunion of September 9, 1996, the Board of Governors
of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 25 1 invited the Banco de Mexico and eight
other central banks to become BIS members. The selection of the new members was based
244. See Mexico: January 1998, supra note 243.
245. See The Mexican Economy 1997, supra note 106, at I(1).
246. See id.
247. See Banco de Mexico Net Assets Rise, Reserves Fall, REUTERS NEWS SERV., June 30, 1998.
248. The original support committed by the U.S. Government totaled $20 billion. At its peak in July
1995, Mexico's outstanding balance owed to the United States reached $12.5 billion. By January
1996, however, Mexico had already repaid $2 billion of short-term liabilities, and in August 1996,
Mexico made an early payment of another $7 billion, leaving $3.5 billion remaining. See The
Mexican Economy 1997, supra note 106, III(1)(a).
249. See Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico, Economic Policy Guidelines for 1998, App. D (visited
Nov. 1997) <http://www.shcp.gob.mx/english/docs/crit98/crit98e.html>.
250. S&P, an international financial credit rating agency, recently revised its outlook on Mexico from
"stable" to "positive,' reflecting its favorable view of the unprecedented political liberalization, the
sustained economic expansion, the strengthening of balance-of-payment fundamentals, and the
recuperation of the banking system. See S&P Affirms Outlook on Mexico's Currency, MExico Bus.
MONTHLY, Oct. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13104353.
251. The BIS is the world's oldest international financial institution. It is the only central banking
institution at the international level that is owned and controlled by central banks. The BIS car-
ries out a number of highly specialized services for central banks, provides a forum for interna-
tional monetary cooperation, and functions as a center for monetary and economic research. The
Mexican Economy 1997, supra note 106, 111(7).
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on selective economic and financial criteria, as well as contributions to global economic
and financial cooperation. The invitation extended to the Banco de Mexico recognizes
Mexico's economic and financial significance, the role the Banco de Mexico has played in
promoting cooperation among central banks around the world, and the Banco de Mexico's
active participation in the BIS.
II. Remaining Deficiencies and Areas for Improvement.
Although developments since the first quarter of 1995 have been mostly positive,
Mexico's financial system still suffers from inadequacy in several areas. Until these inade-
quacies are addressed, the financial system will remain vulnerable to major economic
shocks such as the December 1994 peso devaluation. In fact, some financial advisors con-
tinue to urge investors to use caution when considering investments in Mexico.252
One conspicuous deficiency in Mexico's financial system is that it provides numerous
incentives for moral hazard. The incentives for moral hazard are due, in part, to the way in
which the intervention and recapitalization of troubled banks was carried out. First, the
regulatory authorities failed to compel managers and shareholders to share enough of the
losses. Moreover, instead of a single bailout, there were multiple bailouts. As a result, bank
managers and shareholders may now be more inclined to incur excessive risk on the
assumption that the government will consent to similar bailouts in the future.
Other aspects of the response to the crisis could induce moral hazard as well. For
instance, the general extension of debtor aid programs, such as ADE, FINAPE, and FOPY-
ME, could encourage some debtors, who would otherwise be willing and able to repay their
debts, to refuse to pay their debt obligations until they receive such government assistance.
Another source of moral hazard arises from the lack of a proper Mexican deposit
insurance system and from the government's implicit 100 percent deposit coverage. Since
the beginning of the crisis, the government has indicated that it will fully guarantee com-
mercial banks' obligations with the exception of subordinated debt, an implicit guarantee
of all of the banks' deposits. 253 Such a sweeping implicit deposit guarantee scheme reduces
bank managers' and directors' incentives to assure the efficient operation of the financial
institution and to avoid excessive risk-taking. The recently enacted financial reform legisla-
tion, which will gradually impose limits on deposit insurance, is a considerable first step in
addressing this source of moral hazard.
Mexico continues to suffer from a weak and inadequate bankruptcy system. An ideal
robust financial system possesses a sound and well-developed legal and juridical frame-
work, including a developed bankruptcy system. Well-defined bankruptcy laws make it
possible to take possession of collateral, as well as to pursue other legal recourse, without
undue delay. The bankruptcy laws in effect in 1995 (and still in effect today) were so cum-
252. As recently as May of 1998, Moody's Investors Service cautioned that the Mexican banking sys-
tem still suffers from extremely weak financial fundamentals. For example, Mexico has the lowest
average bank financial strength rating (E+) of any major country in Latin America. Moreover,
although it is not reflected on banks' balance sheets, banks are still liable for contingent losses on
approximately 25% of loans sold to FOBAPROA, which creates a significant exposure to credit
risk. See Moody's, supra note 229.
253. SeeAyer, supra note 18, at 19.
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bersome and inefficient that they afforded many debtors virtual immunity from collection
efforts.254 A deficient bankruptcy system also hampers corporate restructurings and this
has had a negative effect on the quality of Mexican bank portfolios since a significant per-
centage of the banks' debtors are corporations.
Although Mexico has made substantial improvement in the capacity and effectiveness
of its regulatory and supervisory system, there still remains room for improvement. Above
all, it is important that supervisors break free from the "rituals" of banking supervision,
which for years have allowed formal compliance with regulations without addressing the
crucial issues of bank solvency, profitability, and competition.255 Recent CNBV initiatives
to eliminate the practice of permanently stationing on-site inspectors within the financial
institutions should help to solve this problem.
Conflicts of interest stem from the government regulators' dual role as "watchdog"
and supporter of financial institutions. Not only were regulators responsible for monitor-
ing the banks and disciplining improper behavior, they were also responsible for orches-
trating the bank rescue plan. During the financial crisis regulators focused on performing
the role of supporter, organizing various bailouts and facilitating sales and mergers of
institutions. Unfortunately, they somewhat disregarded their role as watchdog of the same
financial institutions. The consequences of this failure have been made painfully evident
by the discovery in early 1998 that a drug cartel was successful in purchasing a small
Mexican bank in 1995,256 and also by the May 1998 sting operation conducted by U.S. law
enforcement officers that uncovered widespread involvement by Mexican banks in money
laundering schemes. 257 These two revelations demonstrate the shortcomings of the previ-
ous supervisory practices and the need for the regulatory agencies to shift their focus more
towards the role of watchdog.
254. In 1994, an initial draft of a bankruptcy reform program was proposed that would have lifted the
effective immunity of debtors. Unfortunately, the legislation was never enacted. See id.
255. See Krivoy, supra note 4, at 176.
256. Mexican officials from the CNBV discovered in early 1998 that Mexican drug traffickers from the
Juarez Cartel obtained a license from the Ministry of Finance in April 1995 to purchase a small
domestic bank. The true owners of the bank were only uncovered after regulators detected fraud
at the bank 19 months later. See Leslie Crawford, Mexico Drug Men 'Bought Bank' FIN. TIMES
(London) Mar. 17, 1998.
257. In May 1998, U.S. prosecutors announced that they had broken a vast drug-money laundering
scheme involving 12 of Mexico's 19 largest banks. The three-year sting operation, termed
"Operation Casablanca" was described by Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin as the "largest and
most comprehensive drug-money laundering case in the history of the United States law enforce-
ment?' See David L. Geese & David Jackson, Mexican Banks Indicted in Drug-Cash Laundering:
U.S. Says Vast Operation Has Been Broken, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 19, 1998, at Al.
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III. Conclusion.
The evidence suggests that Mexico has emerged from the crisis of 1995. Economic
indicators from 1996 through 1998 show a generally positive trend in the economy in spite
of the negative effects of plummeting oil prices and the financial crises in Asia, Russia, and
Brazil. Nevertheless, Mexico's financial system has not yet risen to the level of robustness
common in other OECD countries. On the contrary, the financial system is still weak and
underperforming. Accordingly, to fully reap the benefits of the renewed growth in private
capital inflows and financial integration with developed markets, the Mexican
Government must continue to pursue an aggressive program of structural reforms in the
banking sector to increase stability. Unless further improvements to the banking sector are
made, the Mexican economy risks being dragged down by the persistent banking difficul-
ties and will remain vulnerable to external economic shocks.
